With Trump, Focus on Winning
Winning is important to President Donald Trump, and losing is unacceptable—which explains why President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine recently emphasized that “The end of the war should be a victory for Trump, not Putin.”
Policymakers at home and abroad would be wise to frame their positions, proposals, plans and policies as Zelensky has: in terms of victory or defeat for Trump.
Calculus
They should begin by emphasizing for Trump this sobering reality: “The threats the United States faces are the most serious and most challenging the nation has encountered since 1945, and include the potential for near-term major war,” as the bipartisan Commission on the National Defense Strategy recently concluded.
The commission is not exaggerating. Russia is waging a war of extermination and expansion in Eastern Europe; occupies parts of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova; threatens using nuclear weapons; has transferred nuclear weapons into Belarus; and props up tyrants in Europe, the Americas and Africa. China has absorbed Hong Kong; threatens to annex Taiwan; boasts the world’s largest navy; menaces the Philippines; and is militarizing islands in the South China Sea, tripling its nuclear arsenal and conducting a cyber-siege against the Free World. North Korea is sending ammunition and troops to aid Russia’s war on Ukraine. Iran supplies Moscow with kamikaze-drones, has launched missiles at Israel, and has unleashed its hydra of terror proxies—Hamas, the Houthis, Hezbollah, Kata’ib Hezbollah—against U.S. troops, Free World allies and international shipping.
This axis of autocrats is not only trying to roll back the Free World; it’s setting the stage for great-power war. As NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte observes, “Danger is moving towards us at full speed.”
Preventing such a war by confronting the danger and deterring the axis of autocrats would be a major win for Trump. Great-power war would be a devastating defeat. Even if America were to emerge victorious after the smoke settled, it would be a Pyrrhic victory because such a war wouldn’t be neatly quarantined “over there.” Instead, it would scar the American homeland. It pays to recall that none of America’s battlefield foes since World War II—not Kim Il-Sung or Ho Chi Minh, not Saddam Hussein or Slobodan Milosevic, not Taliban terrorists or Hezbollah’s henchmen, not bin Laden or Baghdadi—embodied the military-technological-industrial capabilities of peer adversaries like Russia and China. None of them could pummel American territory with waves of missile, drone or nuclear attacks; or target the satellites that ensure American security and propel American commerce; or use cyberspace to cripple our critical infrastructure; or destroy armored divisions and aircraft carriers in an instant; or rip apart the international order that sustains American power and prosperity.
That underscores why America must return to the time-tested principle of deterrence. House and Senate defense leaders should point to the devastating wars waged against Ukraine and Israel to persuade Trump of the need for Cold War-level investments in the armed forces. They should point to history to remind him that during World War I, the U.S. spent an average of 16 percent of GDP waging war; that during World War II, the U.S. spent an average of 27 percent of GDP waging war; that during the Cold War, by contrast, Americans invested an average of 7 percent of GDP on defense to deter Moscow and prevent World War III. Today, we are investing less than half that.
Congressional leaders can point to polls revealing that investing in deterrence is a political winner: 79 percent of Americans support increased defense spending; 73 percent want the military resized to be capable of winning a war against the PRC.
Some around Trump will argue that investing more in deterrence is costly. They’re right. But there’s something more costly than deterring war: waging war. And there’s something even more costly than waging war: losing a war.
Trump will understand this calculus.
Allies
Policymakers abroad should understand that shared history, shared values and shared sacrifice are of little importance to Trump. Instead, America’s allies should focus on the bottom line and how they are helping America—and Trump—stay on top.
Trump has made it clear that there’s no longer any room in the Free World for free riders. The Free World is getting the message.
Whether triggered by Putin’s actions or Trump’s criticisms—probably a little of both—NATO nations are finally serious about the common defense. They should emphasize to Trump that defense spending among NATO’s European members jumped 19 percent last year; that European nations have sent more aid to Ukraine than has the U.S; that NATO’s European members are leading battlegroups in Estonia, Lithuania and Romania; that NATO’s European members are spearheading operations to protect the Baltic Sea from Russia and China, defend the skies of Eastern Europe, and keep peace in the Balkans.
The British should highlight for Trump that they’re deploying 20,000 troops to defend NATO’s northern flank; the Poles that in 2025 they’re investing 5 percent of GDP in defense and in 2024 they unraveled Russia’s terror plot aimed at taking down U.S.-bound civilian aircraft; the French that they’re making historic increases in defense spending and mustering a peacekeeping force for postwar Ukraine; the Germans that they’ve nearly doubled defense spending since 2022 and are organizing efforts to construct a continentwide missile-defense system; the Danes that they’ve invested hundreds of millions in Arctic security; the Finns that they field a massive reserve force of 870,000 troops; the Swedes that their troops have served alongside America’s in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Libya and Iraq.
Ukraine should point out that it has pinned down and ground down Putin’s military. Kiev could add that cutting Ukraine loose would be a costly blunder for America: AEI concludes that “maintaining security in a strategic environment in which Russia is victorious over Ukraine could cost the United States an additional $808 billion…on top of the currently planned defense budget.”
In the Indo-Pacific, Japan should underscore for Trump that it’s doubling defense spending, will soon boast the world’s third-largest defense budget, is deploying U.S.-made Tomahawks to deter Beijing and Pyongyang, is building up the Philippine military, has sent America Patriot missiles to backfill systems sent to Ukraine, and vows to “closely cooperate” with America in the event of a PRC attack on Taiwan.
Australian officials have emphasized it would be “inconceivable that we wouldn’t support the U.S.” in defending Taiwan. They also may want to point to their record-setting 2024 defense budget.
South Korea should inform Trump that it has replenished U.S. weapons stocks, shipped tanks and artillery to Poland, and made indirect weapons deliveries to Ukraine.
Taiwan should highlight how its microchips propel America’s prosperity and security. Indeed, speaking Trump’s language, Taipei calls the U.S.-Taiwan tech partnership “a win-win.”
Israel should emphasize that it has crippled Iran’s offensive capabilities, eviscerated Hezbollah’s ranks, destroyed Houthi military targets and erased Syria’s WMD stockpiles—all threats to America’s security.
In short, our alliances and security partnerships help us. They serve as force-multipliers for American power, stand as outer rings of American security, fuel and sustain American prosperity, and promote American interests—the most important of which is deterring great-power war.
If Trump thinks it’s expensive to deter Moscow and Beijing, to protect U.S. interests, to promote U.S. prosperity today—with our alliances intact—wait until they’re gone. There’s a reason Putin has attacked Georgia and Ukraine but not Poland and Estonia. There’s a reason Xi is circling Taiwan but not Japan. There’s a reason the Kim dynasty has blustered the past 72 years about unifying Korea by force but never tried to do so. That reason is the U.S.-led alliance system.
Help
Polling reveals that 71 percent of Americans support military aid for Israel, 67 percent support military aid for Ukraine, 65 percent support military aid for Taiwan and 57 percent support a more engaged foreign policy.
Translation: Leading the Free World and helping democracies in the crosshairs are political winners.
The converse also holds: Disengaging from global leadership and failing to help democracies under assault are political losers. Consider the political fallout at home and abroad that followed the pullout from Afghanistan—a democracy, albeit a flawed and fragile one, planted by America.
No president—certainly not Trump—wants to be in office with CNN broadcasting images of Russian flags flying over Kiev, or PRC generals sauntering through Taipei, or desperate Ukrainians cramming into outbound cargo planes, or Taiwan’s cabinet imprisoned. No president—certainly not Trump—wants to be in office when arguments and recriminations over “Who lost Ukraine?” or “Who lost Taiwan?” explode.
Former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, like Zelensky, is keen to this reality. As he explains, “You have to make the argument to Trump, ‘Do you want this on your legacy?'” Ukraine and Taiwan supporters alike must tell him, “It’s going to be worse than Vietnam or Afghanistan.” Such an outcome would be “a humiliation…Whatever happens the rest of your presidency, you’re never going to get over it.”
That’s the art of dealing with Trump: helping him see how your policy or your country helps him win—or at the very least, prevents him from losing.
Alan W. Dowd is a senior fellow with the Sagamore Institute, where he heads the Center for America’s Purpose.