U.S. and NATO Need To Learn From Ukraine
NATO and the United States Need to Improve Before They Can Join Ukraine: Lessons Gathered, Not Learned
In the manner of the ancient Greek myth recounting the demise of Icarus due to his hubris—when his wings failed as he flew too close to the sun—the United States and its NATO allies must acknowledge the shortcomings in their strategy, technology, and planning following the initial month of Operation Epic Fury, and open their arms to Ukrainian willingness to assist.
The subpar performance of Western precision weapons in Ukraine’s challenging electronic warfare environment, the absence of immediate options to counter adversary attempts to deplete costly weapons with significantly cheaper attack drones, and repeated failures of NATO troops to perform against Ukrainian red teams in exercises underscore the fact that the United States and its NATO partners are not trained or equipped for the modern battlefield. Consequently, they would likely encounter substantial setbacks in a direct confrontation with China, Russia, and even North Korea, which are rapidly assimilating lessons gleaned from the Ukrainian battlefield. To highlight the development, numerous reports suggest that Iran successfully utilized drones in the Gulf that were deemed too ineffective against Ukrainian defenses.
Meanwhile, the significant and seemingly preventable material losses incurred by the United States and its Gulf allies during Operation Epic Fury indicate that they have not applied lessons clearly recognized but not implemented. A notable example is the damage inflicted on Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia, occurring around March 27-28, 2026. This damage resulted from a coordinated Iranian missile and kamikaze drone strike, which, if reports are accurate, severely damaged U.S. air assets, including a high-value E-3 Sentry AWACS aircraft and refueling tankers, injuring at least 10 to 12 U.S. service members. Photos taken before the attack show the aircraft exposed on the tarmac as if no threat existed, resembling a Russian strategic bomber base before Ukraine’s effective use of deception and drones in Operation Spiderweb. Russia learned from Spiderweb and relocated its aircraft outside known threat rings. Despite over a year of discussions within the Department of Defense about the vulnerability of U.S. air assets—primarily concerning Guam—and a prior recognition that Iranian weapons could reach Prince Sultan, high-value aircraft remained unprotected without hardened shelters or adequate air defenses.
Ukraine has, by necessity, developed proficiency in the offensive use of battlefield drones and interceptors. Russia often engages Ukrainian targets with a barrage of hundreds of Shahed drones, supplemented by ballistic and cruise missiles, hoping to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses. To date, Russia has achieved limited success. In March alone, as reported by Ukrainian Defense Minister Mikhaylo Fedorov, inexpensive Ukrainian interceptor drones set a record, intercepting over 33,000 enemy uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs), including Shahed drones, across the country. With probable assistance from Russia and China, Iran has learned from these tactics, and similar strategies have been observed on a smaller scale in attacks against U.S. Gulf partners and in the destruction of costly fixed land-based infrastructure.
Western nations can draw immediate lessons from Ukraine’s concept of “saturated air defense.” While Ukraine employs traditional layered and point-defense strategies, it also integrates AI-enabled battle management tools, which are fed by acoustic sensors, radar, and other inputs, including manual data that maximize coverage, enhance target assignment, tracking, and engagement. These assets include mobile fire teams and shoulder-fired missiles. The objective is to utilize the most effective asset, with the highest probability of a kill, and to provide attack options at numerous points along a threat trajectory.
European and Gulf states are increasingly looking to Ukraine for military training and technical support. However, mentioning Ukraine as a superior source of knowledge or technology is anathema to many in the U.S. defense establishment. No nation, including the United States, has had the same level of experience on the modern battlefield. This hubris is shortsighted and undermines preparations for modern warfare. A Ukrainian officer recently remarked, “When NATO trained us, it was by the book. That book is now being rewritten every day on the battlefield by both Ukraine and Russia.”
Every aspect of warfare, from infantry tactics to electronic warfare to medical evacuation, is being redefined daily. Western weapons, with possibly the exception of PAC-3s, became virtually ineffective against Russian countermeasures within weeks of reaching the battlefield. Fortunately for Ukraine, its technological innovation, which draws inspiration from the energy and speed of Western startup culture, is advancing at a pace that the United States and NATO have not been able to match, even to the point where it is able to decouple itself from Chinese components and produce most elements for drones domestically.
Ukrainian trainers are now providing retroactive training and developing concepts of operations for U.S.-developed plans. Battlefield-proven, cost-effective interceptors, produced by both Ukrainian and U.S. firms, are being rapidly deployed to the Gulf to address major gaps in point defense and meet the high demand for quickly deployable, cost-effective capabilities.
It has become painfully evident that, despite significant advancements in modern warfare, particularly in uncrewed aerial systems, the United States has been slow to learn from these lessons and to develop cost-effective, scalable, and rapidly deployable solutions. Reports from the Gulf indicate that our allies received even less training, with unconfirmed reports suggesting that in one incident, a partner nation exhausted eight PAC-3 interceptors to take down a single inexpensive Shahed drone. Combatant Commands and service components are responsible for constructing and training regional partners on a defense concept specific to each campaign. There can be little doubt that combined air defense training and exercises have been inadequately updated to address the current air threats, which are further complicated by the ongoing Yemeni threat that has always existed in the background.
Ironically, during the Munich Security Summit at Ukraine House, an AI-generated short film depicted swarms of Shahed drones attacking Brussels and Davos, seemingly foreshadowing events involving the UAE and other Gulf nations. Today, it is evident that Ukraine, once viewed as a student in military matters, has emerged as a leader. Many NATO countries are wisely seeking Ukrainian training and establishing defense technology partnerships.
Western shortcomings are highlighted by the outcomes of two recent NATO exercises—one on land and one at sea—in which Ukrainian forces decisively defeated NATO forces. The first exercise was Exercise Hedgehog, conducted in March 2025 in Estonia. This exercise involved a team of 10 Ukrainian troops who acted as the adversary, engaging nearly a dozen NATO nations (with the notable absence of the United States), each contributing land, air, and support forces. The small Ukrainian team, primarily composed of experienced drone pilots, managed to defeat the equivalent of two NATO brigades by combining reconnaissance, first-person-view (FPV) strikes, and bomber drones. They executed a rapid “find-track-strike” approach that inflicted heavy losses on larger NATO units in a short timeframe. Their decentralized structure, real-time data sharing, and ability to coordinate multiple drones simultaneously demonstrated a faster, more dynamic combat method than current NATO strategies. Although these outcomes were part of a training scenario rather than actual combat, the Ukrainian performance underscored the increasing importance of drones, speed, and adaptability on the modern battlefield, serving as a clear wake-up call for NATO.
During NATO’s REPMUS/Dynamic Messenger 2025 naval exercises off the coast of Portugal, Ukrainian forces, primarily from the naval sector, once again played the role of adversary and demonstrated their capability to challenge larger NATO forces across all five maritime scenarios. NATO forces, including the United States, were unable to protect shipping and port infrastructure against the Ukrainian opponent. Ukrainian personnel drew on their extensive combat experience to simulate contemporary maritime threats, particularly through the use of uncrewed surface and aerial systems.
Ukrainian forces employed advanced tactics, including coordinated drone strikes and rapid targeting. Their involvement highlighted vulnerabilities in traditional naval tactics; in several scenarios, Ukrainian-led teams successfully penetrated defenses and even simulated the sinking of NATO vessels. They effectively used unmanned surface drones (such as Magura-type systems) to conduct simulated modern maritime attacks. In multiple scenarios, these drone swarms were able to breach NATO naval defenses, successfully simulating strikes on high-value targets, including the repeated simulation of sinking a NATO frigate using a Magura V7 drone. A significant takeaway is that defenders were often unaware of the incoming threats, exposing gaps in detection and defense against drone swarms.
As the United States faces a potentially challenging conflict in the Gulf—especially as Iran receives support and guidance from Russia and China—and as NATO strengthens its defenses in anticipation of possible hostile actions from Moscow, it is crucial to analyze the lessons from the Ukraine conflict thoroughly. Learning from these experiences involves more than merely recording events for future reference or issuing reports. Instead, these lessons require careful consideration across the entire DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities). Potential future adversaries have already shown how seriously they regard Ukraine, indicating that for the United States and NATO to confront conflicts effectively, they should integrate Kyiv into the most closely aligned military partnership possible within political constraints. The current Gulf conflict serves as a testament to the reality that nations like Iran, which successfully implement the lessons they acquire, may exceed expectations—at least temporarily—compared to those that do not, regardless of the strength of their adversaries.
Dr. Josh “Bugsy” Segal is former arms control negotiator, and retired military planner. He currently serves as freelance advisor to numerous Dept of War senior leaders and in nonresident associate fellow for Globsec.