The Western View of Taiwan’s Defense
As the Taiwanese legislature continues to debate the merits of a major defense spending bill by the Democratic Progressive Party (DDP). Taiwan must be aware that it risks being viewed by the West as an ally with a credible chance of being rapidly overwhelmed. As an alternative to the DDP’s proposed legislation, the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) introduced a bill which capped defence spending at NT$400 billion (12.6 billion USD) instead of NT$1.25 trillion (39.74 billion USD), while also omitting the provisions of the larger bill which called for the procurement of drone platforms, a larger integrated air defense system (IADS) know as the T-Dome, spare parts for attack helicopters, and more. Such a lack of preparation would reduce the opportunities allies have to come to its defense, especially if Taiwan seems politically weak, and the military balance of power appears too lop-sided in favor of China.
It is true that the United States has a vested interest in the defense of Taiwan, and will likely be compelled to intervene in a conflict due to its military alliance with Japan, which has outright stated its intent to intervene. However, the current setting does not bode well in regard to the array of options available to allied militaries which seek to aid Taiwan in its efforts. Further, Taiwanese expectations of allied intervention must be properly calibrated. The current Trump Administration has highlighted multiple times that they may not defend allies who do not defend themselves. This statement should not be taken simply as the anomalous by-product of the current administrations’ realist-driven outlook. Instead, this is a tangible warning based on a pattern previously identified by war planners during the Biden Administration’s tumultuous first few weeks trying to decide on its support for Ukraine.
As war commenced, the expectation of a rapid Ukrainian capitulation prompted allied leaders to believe that entering the war on Ukraine’s side would likely not avert defeat, would risk heavy losses, and lead to an escalatory spiral. However, the rapid culmination of Russia’s effort in multiple directions quickly altered the risk calculus for allied involvement. It is at this point that Ukraine and certain North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies begun discussing the feasibility of a no-fly zone. However, given the length of time necessary for allied air forces to prepare such for such an operation over Ukraine, this would have been impossible to accomplish without escalation as it would have also compelled Russia to prepare a countervailing response.
The beginning weeks of the Ukraine war highlight the dynamics which underly conflicts and the early ability to escalate before political agreements are made, primarily to avert the use of nuclear weapons. The initial shock of an outbreak of war and the subsequent lack of reliable accounts – or fog-of-war – creates an environment that is not subject to immediate interpretation. It is during this crucial period that there is the greatest possibility of allied intervention. This is because, unless it is otherwise explicitly stated prior to the war, there is a relatively reduced risk of nuclear escalation as military leaders are given a significant amount of leeway in responding to a threat before their political counter-parts begin to rapidly establish communications with opposite states in an effort to either deescalate or establish clear red-lines. The aftermath results in the establishment of a status-quo wherein each side begins to understand their opponent’s operational intent and the location of their main thrusts. Surprise is still possible, but as the rules of a particular conflict begin to emerge it is understood that the possibility of major allied intervention occurs under the specter of nuclear weapons. This compels states to adhere to a tenuous, but established status-quo, thus avoiding potential involvement or support which could prove decisive. This explains the Biden Administration’s reluctance in allowing Ukraine to use ATACMS to strike deep into Russian supply lines.
The geographic particularities of Taiwan also lend it to difficulties which were not experienced in the allied effort to supply Ukraine. The island is particularly small, and though some areas will be safer from the effects of Chinese long-range missiles and drone strikes it’s main manufacturing areas near the coast will be exposed. This is unlike the situation in Ukraine, where the Polish city of Rzeszów could be used as a safe-haven logistical hub before equipment went on to be transported, primarily by train, towards Ukraine by way of Lviv, 70km from Poland and over 1000km from the nearest front-line, and then further East. Any resupply of Taiwan will be heavily dependent on it having a safe coast which allows for equipment to reach its destination and be disembarked. The People’s Liberation Army Navy’s intention to surround Taiwan, as evidence by the recent “Justice Mission 2025“, will severely confound such efforts unless the Republic of China Army can credibly and consistently degrade Chinese naval assets and raise the risk calculus of maritime operations.
If Taiwan is to one day require allied warplanes, soldiers, or further trainers and advisors on its soil during a war; it must be able to offer a compelling argument for allied involvement on the basis of it denying a Chinese military effort to rapidly overwhelm the island. This means causing a significant amount of attrition early and clearly protecting its most important centers of gravity, such as its political institutions and military command nodes. The difficulty is that Taiwan must not simply defend itself successfully for a few weeks or months, by which point allied efforts in resupplying the island can occur incrementally so as to avoid escalation. It’s defense and political apparatus must overwhelmingly present itself as robust and unlikely to rapidly capitulate if they are to convince the West that their efforts are not futile. This would allow the United States and its allies to quickly intervene and consolidate positions around and even within Taiwan if it is not deemed overwhelmingly precarious. The presence of Marine Special Forces on the islands of Penghu and Kinmen already present the United States’ Military with an option to rapidly reinforce those contingents, if it is at all possible at least in the case of Penghu. While the island of Okinawa could provide the launching-pad for the rapid deployment of a Marine contingent meant to assist Taiwanese defense efforts, while also politically entrenching American involvement in the conflict. Such a scenario would make it difficult for Beijing to diplomatically isolate Taiwan from its allies in subsequent political engagements aimed at deconfliction, at least without the outright threat of nuclear war. While China’s arsenal is rapidly expanding, the United States’ still maintains an overwhelming preponderance of strategic nuclear assets, and an established nuclear triad. However, if Taiwan fails to do so, allied war planners will come to observe that the Taiwanese situation is futile and will instead plan for broader interdiction efforts of People’s Liberation Armed Forces assets while attempting to support the island from a distance. Such an allied plan would favor operating from already established military bases throughout the First and Second Island Chains, while Taipei conducts its defense almost on its own and its allies struggle to reach it.
This consideration highlights the importance of Taiwan’s current special defense bill which aims at funding it’s “T-Dome” air defense system, and the acquisition of asymmetric drone warfare assets. At the outbreak of war, Taiwan’s primary concern will be to show political resolve, and to ensure the combat effectiveness of its military is not degraded too significantly by China’s significant stockpile of missiles. As observed in the allied intervention of Kosovo, competently operated mobile air defenses can be very difficult to destroy and can hinder the planning of opposing air operations. Further, the complications generated by an effective integrated air defense system can pull assets towards Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD/DEAD) and away from the targeting of military assets meant to repel the subsequent invasion effort. Throughout such a bombardment, Chinese information operations will likely attempt to promote the idea that the devastating effects of its missile barrages have broken the Taiwanese will to fight, and that an invasion effort would be relatively unopposed. Taiwan must maintain enough of a defense capacity to continue to threaten such an invasion effort, while demonstrating continued social and political cohesion if it is to convince its Western allies that its resistance is not futile.
To provide allied forces with a measure of opportunity in intervening at the outbreak of conflict or within a period of uncertainty, Taiwan must continue preparing militarily. If the current more narrowly focused bill is the only path to defense spending, the government in Taipei should incentivize efforts aimed at civil defense, and realistic military exercises which improve the survivability of its forces. It must also remember that it should not simply expect allied involvement at the outbreak of war, but that it plays an important role in providing its allies with the opportunity to get involved.
Athiththan Thilagaraj is the President of the Canadian Center for Strategic Studies, and an international relations scholar at Concordia University, Montreal.
Alexandru Filip is a Research Fellow with the Dupuy Institute.