The U.S. Needs an Arctic Strategy It Can Sustain
In January 2025, a battalion commander conducting Arctic operations in subzero temperatures described the fundamental operational constraint this way: “Operational reach is a dynamic metric that leadership closely manage. It takes into consideration the formation’s overall combat power and a thorough look at tempo combined with the ability to sustain the formation.”
What he meant was simpler. In the Arctic, operational reach is determined by how long a soldier survives before cold kills him.
Water freezes in 90 minutes. Soldiers need four to six liters daily. A rifle squad in combat requires nine gallons. Soldiers burn 4,600 calories daily in extreme cold—nearly triple standard rations. Batteries lose 80 percent capacity. Vehicles must run continuously or freeze solid. If a unit stops for more than 15 minutes in subzero temperatures, it must halt for hours to set up warming shelters or soldiers will develop hypothermia and frostbite.
The battalion achieved its military objective. Operational reach was the problem that remained.
The Pattern
In February 2026, a New York Times journalist embedded with the 11th Airborne Division covering a training exercise involving 4,000 soldiers in extreme cold. By day nine, American and Canadian forces had achieved their tactical objective. The opposition force was in checkmate.
The American forces were running low on fuel.
The Canadian soldiers had weighed every piece of equipment before deployment. They planned how far their troops could move each day. They had three times as many snowmobiles as the American battalions. Their soldiers were accustomed to operating in extreme cold.
A brigade commander overseeing the American element said it directly: “The American technique is go, go, go until you can’t anymore. The Canadian approach was more effective.”
The Army’s 2021 Arctic Strategy promises to “regain Arctic dominance.” The DoD’s 2024 Arctic Strategy promises to “exercise presence…to demonstrate interoperability and credible joint capabilities.”
What the Strategies Say
Both documents emphasize the competitive environment, the need for presence, and the requirement that the U.S. military operate in extreme cold. Both are correct. Neither answers the prior question.
What specific political objectives require the U.S. to seize, defend, or sustain Arctic infrastructure? An airfield? A port? A resource site? A chokepoint? Once that decision is made, what operational art does the seizure and holding of that infrastructure demand? What logistics train? What rotation cycle? What force structure? What does environmental constraint change about combined arms integration, sustainment cycles, and campaign design?
The strategies do not say. They describe the competitive environment. They emphasize readiness and presence. They do not make the institutional decision about what the presence is supposed to accomplish.
The February 2026 Yukon exercise revealed why this distinction matters. American and Canadian forces conducted a training scenario with 4,000 soldiers in extreme cold. By day nine, both had achieved their tactical objective. The opposition force was in checkmate. The American forces were running out of fuel. The Canadian forces, operating on a planned rotation and logistics model, sustained the operation. A brigade commander overseeing the American element observed the difference directly: ‘The American technique is go, go, go until you can’t anymore. The Canadian approach was more effective.’ The exercise did not reveal a future problem. It revealed a present one.
What Historical Campaigns Show
The Winter War, from 1939 to 1940, was a Soviet invasion of Finland with superior manpower and materiel. The outcome turned on infrastructure and logistics. Soviet forces had to move through terrain that Finnish defenders controlled. The Finns destroyed roads, blocked supply lines, and inflicted attrition faster than Soviet logistics could sustain it. By the terms of the settlement, Finland retained its independence. Dominance by numbers did not translate to operational success because the side that could not sustain logistics in that environment could not sustain the campaign.
Operation Claymore in March 1941 was a British commando raid on the Lofoten Islands to destroy fish oil and glycerin facilities that supplied Nazi Germany. Operation Anklet in December 1941 hit similar targets. The Arctic convoys that followed were not about dominance. They were about specific logistics objectives—moving supplies to an ally—against a defined threat in a specific geography. The campaign design flowed from the objective, not from a general assertion about presence or dominance.
Russia made the institutional choice the U.S. has not yet made. Over the past two decades, Russia rebuilt from early Arctic bases to a coherent Arctic force structure. It established dedicated brigades. It conducted persistent exercises testing logistics, sustainment, and operational reach in extreme cold. It positioned icebreakers and maritime capability. It integrated airfields, air defense, and ground forces into a coordinated operational design. Russia did not promise dominance as an abstraction. It built specific capability against specific objectives in specific terrain.
What Gets Left Unanswered
The Yukon exercise confirmed what the battalion commander described. Tactical success and operational exhaustion are not the same thing. The Army has made the institutional choice to maintain the 11th Airborne Division and conduct Arctic training at the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center. That is serious institutional commitment. It is not the same as the commitment to answer what operational architecture Arctic ground forces require.
The gap is embedded in the institution’s own language. Strategy talks about dominance and mastery. Reality shows forces managing cold injury risk mitigation. Exercise controllers measure survival and speed. Neither strategy makes the choice of what specific Arctic infrastructure matters visible and what operational art is required to seize and defend it.
Until that choice is made, Arctic strategies will continue to promise dominance while exercises reveal the environmental constraints dominance must work within. The Army will train soldiers to survive in cold. Russia will train soldiers to operate in cold against specific targets. There is a difference.
The Question
The DoD should name the specific Arctic infrastructure objectives that political leadership might require. Strategy should follow from that decision, not precede it. Dominance over what terrain, for what purpose, sustained how? The Yukon exercise already showed that gap. Unless that choice is made now, Arctic strategies will continue to promise dominance while operations reveal the consequence.
Michael Carvelli is an Army officer who writes on operational planning, protection, and engineering. He has written on large-scale combat operations for Real Clear Defense, War on the Rocks, Parameters, Modern War Institute, and Small Wars Journal.
The views expressed are his own and do not represent those of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. government.
image: U.S. Army Soldiers assigned to 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry Regiment, 1st Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Air Assault), 11th Airborne Division returns downhill after an engagement with opposing force during Joint Pacific Multi-National Readiness Center 26-02 on the Yukon Training, Alaska Feb. 22, 2026. The 11th Airborne Division is setting the standard for Arctic readiness, demonstrating the skills and capabilities needed to succeed in this challenging environment. (U.S. Army 11th Airborne Division)