Russia’s Strategy for Dominance in Eurasia

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Between Coercion, Integration, and Hybrid Warfare

In the years immediately following the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the Russian elite viewed this event as a geopolitical catastrophe, resulting in the loss of a superpower’s sphere of influence and a decade of national humiliation. As a result, re-establishing Russian dominance in the post-Soviet space (“near abroad”) became one of the most important and enduring goals of Russian foreign policy. Re-establishing dominance does not simply mean regaining control over former territories, but instead includes creating a zone of privileged political, economic, and security interests, thus restoring Russia as a great power and indispensable actor in Eurasian affairs.

Unlike the ideologically driven project of the USSR, Russian foreign policy today is pragmatic and adaptable, utilizing three forms of method: direct and indirect coercion, institutional and economic integration, and hybrid subversive warfare. These different approaches allow the Russian government to respond flexibly to various situations depending upon context ranging from the “frozen conflicts” of Transnistria and South Ossetia to the energy markets of Central Europe.

This paper will examine the theoretical framework and practical applications of this approach. It argues that Russia’s efforts can be best understood through an integrated theoretical lens: Realism helps explain why Russia is seeking territorial buffers and military preeminence; Liberal institutionalism describes how regional organizations (such as the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU)) provide mechanisms to bind weaker states; and Constructivism explains the significant role that narratives of history and identity play in the legitimization of Russian leadership. Finally, the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the 2022 full scale invasion of Ukraine will serve as critical cases that demonstrate both the effectiveness and the potential long-term erosion of Russia’s strategic position as a consequence of its reliance on coercion.

Theoretical Framework: An Integrated Paradigmatic Approach

Russia’s Eurasian strategy cannot be explained by any single paradigm. Thus, a multi-paradigmatic explanation is needed to address the complex relationships between power, institutions, and ideas.

According to Realism, Russia’s actions represent a typical reaction to perceived strategic vulnerability and decline in relative power. From the perspective of neorealist authors, such as John Mearsheimer, Russia’s actions were prompted by NATO’s eastward expansion and the perceived existential threat posed to Russia. The pursuit of territorial buffers, denial of hegemony to others (especially the U.S. and NATO), and the demonstration of military resolve in Georgia (2008) and Ukraine are all characteristics of offensive realism. Military coercion, including nuclear signaling and deploying forces to Belarus and Kaliningrad, constitutes the ultimate guarantor of this zone of influence.

Liberal institutionalism offers an additional way of looking at Russia’s actions by emphasizing the use of economic interdependence and regional institutions to exert control. Rather than rejecting international organizations, Russia has attempted to establish new ones that are under its control. The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) are all examples of new institutions that have been developed to promote economic interdependence, facilitate coordination of security policies among members, and tie member states into a Russia-centric orbit. Russia utilizes energy exports as a principal geo-economic tool to reward loyal allies, punish unfaithful ones, and to finance its coercive apparatus. Energy exports have been utilized to create dependency in countries outside the European Union, such as Moldova and Belarus.

Constructivism offers another conceptual approach to understanding the ideational and identity-based motivations behind Russia’s strategy. The Kremlin has promoted a narrative of “Russian World” (Russkiy Mir) that is based on common language, culture, and Orthodox Christianity to justify interference in the internal affairs of neighboring states that have Russian speaking populations. The civilizational discourse promoted by the Kremlin, which contrasts a morally conservative, sovereign Russia with a decadent, liberal West, provides a legitimate ideological rationale for action. Additionally, this discourse transforms geopolitical maneuvers into a mission to protect compatriots and restore historical unity that resonates with many of the domestic population and segments of the diaspora.

The Triad of Russian Foreign Policy

Coercion and Hard Power

The most apparent element of Russian foreign policy is coercion. This may take the form of overt military conquest, or alternatively, frequent displays of force. Russia employed coercion to solidify control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia after its conflict with Georgia in 2008. The 2014 annexation of Crimea represented a fait accompli that was facilitated by “little green men” (unidentifiable special forces) and rapidly followed by a conventional military deployment. The ongoing war in Ukraine represents the greatest and most destructive application of coercion to date and is directed toward subordinating a state that sought to align itself with the West.

While Russia employs coercion through outright warfare, it also employs a strategy of “escalate to de-escalate.” Russia leverages its nuclear capabilities to prevent Western nations from intervening in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Rhetoric regarding the threat of nuclear attack, the placement of tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, and military exercises simulating nuclear attacks are all intended to divide NATO and to limit the level of support provided to Ukraine. Moreover, Russia maintains and manipulates “frozen conflicts” in Moldova (Transnistria) and Georgia to use them as leverage to veto those countries’ membership in the EU and other Euro-Atlantic associations and to maintain their neutrality or vulnerability.

Managed Integration and Economic Interdependence

Simultaneous to the utilization of coercion, Russia has pursued a project of managed integration. The primary regional organization utilized in this regard is the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which was established in 2015 with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan. While described as an economic community similar to the EU, the EAEU’s primary purpose is to create a captive market for Russian goods and services, to standardize regulatory frameworks under Russian leadership, and to weaken the economic ties of member states to external partners.

Energy is the most effective tool of managed integration and coercion. For many years, pipelines such as Nord Stream created deep levels of dependency in Germany and Central Europe. While the 2022 invasion of Ukraine dramatically changed this relationship, Russia still utilizes energy as a political tool to apply pressure on non-EU countries such as Moldova and Belarus. Trade restrictions such as bans on Ukrainian goods and Georgian wines are commonly employed by Russia as punishment for uncooperative behavior. The combination of incentives (energy subsidies, market access) and disincentives (trade embargos, transit fees) aim to render resistance economically costly.

Subversive Hybrid Warfare

Subversive hybrid warfare refers to the blurring of war and peace, and the employment of non-military means to achieve strategic objectives. Russia’s approach to hybrid warfare is characterized as the “Gerasimov Doctrine,” and places emphasis on the utility of non-linear and information-centered operations. Examples of key tactics employed by Russia include:

Cyber Operations: Cyberattacks that target critical infrastructure (e.g., Ukraine’s electricity system), espionage, and the dissemination of malicious code.

Information Warfare: Russia’s vast network of state-run media (e.g., RT, Sputnik), proxy outlets, and social media bot accounts create a virtual ecosystem designed to spread disinformation and undermine public confidence in democratic institutions and to justify Russia’s actions.

Political and Economic Subversion: Funding for sympathetic political parties (e.g., far right and far left parties in Europe), the utilization of oligarchic networks for influence, and the use of corruption to co-opt foreign elites.

Proxy and Paramilitary Forces: Russia employs proxy and paramilitary forces (e.g., the Wagner Group) to provide deniable military capabilities to conduct missions in Syria and sub-Saharan Africa while maintaining plausible deniability.

These tools enable Russia to engage in constant, low-cost campaigns below the threshold of conventional war and to destabilize adversaries and to extend influence without provoking a full-scale military response.

Analysis of Cases: The Ukrainian Crucible

Ukraine is the central battleground in which all elements of Russia’s Eurasian strategy have collided with determined national resistance and the support of the West. For Russia, an independent, democratic, and pro-Western Ukraine poses a fatal threat to its strategic interests both a loss of a core buffer zone and an ideational threat to the “Russian World” narrative.

Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 was a tactical masterpiece of hybrid coercion and achieved a significant goal with minimum use of conventional forces. However, it also represented a strategic turning point in that it shattered the post-Cold War security order and triggered the first round of severe Western sanctions. Russia’s support for conflict in Donbas, however, was useful in keeping Ukraine weak and divided, but it also galvanized Ukrainian national identity in opposition to Russia.

Russia’s decision to launch a full-scale invasion in February 2022 represents the final failure of coercion and integration. Having failed to subordinate Ukraine through limited warfare, energy blackmail, and cyber-attacks, Russia chose to pursue maximum military aggression. This aggressive campaign was predicated on the assumption that there would be a rapid victory and Western disunity and has instead resulted in a disastrous miscalculation. Instead of uniting NATO, generating a new German defense policy, and imposing unprecedented sanctions that have severed Russia’s economy from high-technology and financial systems of the advanced West, Russia has created a slow and grinding war of attrition that is exhausting Russian military and economic resources at unsustainable rates and revealing the limitations of Russian conventional military power.

A Consequence of a Strategy for Dominating Eurasia, and A Strategic Paradox

The strategy pursued by Russia to dominate Eurasia has resulted in a major strategic paradox: its actions have produced the very results intended to be avoided by those actions.

Strengthened NATO: The two previously neutral countries, Finland and Sweden, have entered NATO and extended the border of NATO and Russia by approximately 1,300 kilometers; NATO is currently stronger and more united than at any time during the Cold War.

Destruction of Economic Leverage: European nations rapidly shifted their reliance from Russian hydrocarbon energy resources and effectively ended all of Russia’s tools for leveraging the long-term benefit of the sale of hydrocarbon energy products. Due to the destruction of the Nord Stream pipeline system, Russia can no longer sell its hydrocarbon energy products to Europe; instead, Russia must sell hydrocarbon energy products at discounted prices to remote markets in Asia.

Creation of a Stronger Ukrainian National Consciousness: The invasion of Ukraine created a strong, anti-Russia Ukrainian national identity and, therefore, any future Ukrainian nation-state will remain a permanent and hostile neighbor to Russia.

Global Isolation, and Dependence on China: Russia is currently dependent upon China for both the economic and political support required to maintain Russia’s status as a key player in Eurasia; this dependence on China has significantly reduced Russia’s ability to act independently in Eurasia.

Although Russia possesses the ability to wage conventional wars, engage in cyber-attacks, and employ other forms of hybrid warfare, its long-term trend is one of relatively declining influence. Its economy is now focused solely on maintaining a war machine and meeting basic consumption needs; there is no focus on the development of new technologies or competing globally. Russia also faces dire demographic challenges and has lost all of its soft power within Western society.

Conclusion:

The strategy of Russia to gain control of Eurasia through coercion, integration, and hybrid warfare is a sophisticated combination of three components of foreign policy: (1) realist security concerns, (2) liberal institutional manipulation, and (3) constructivist identity politics. The strategy was successful in the short to medium term in gaining control of land, destabilizing neighboring states, and forcing the world to pay attention to Russia. The annexation of Crimea was an extremely successful example of how this strategy could be used.

However, the full-scale invasion of Ukraine exposed the fatal flaw of the strategy: its extreme reliance on coercion leads to the formation of powerful countervailing strategies. When Russia crossed several of the most important boundaries of international law, it unified its enemies, destroyed the foundation of its own economy, and weakened its long-term strategic position. Although the Kremlin may achieve some tactical successes in Ukraine or in other parts of the world, the price will be the continued loss of its influence, wealth, and future opportunities. In the end, Russia’s attempt to establish a 21st century sphere of influence will accelerate its transformation into an isolated, militarized state which is increasingly dependent upon a single ally and whose purpose is to disrupt rather than provide positive leadership.

Chick Edmond is a Political Scientist and Graduate Researcher in the International Studies program at Old Dominion University. His research focuses on Nuclear Deterrence Strategies, Geopolitics in Europe/Africa and the balance of power between NATO and Russia.