Russia’s Latest Large Strategic Nuclear Exercise and Russia’s Nuclear Doctrine

Russia’s Latest Large Strategic Nuclear Exercise and Russia’s Nuclear Doctrine: The Implications for U.S. Nuclear Deterrence

In late October 2024, Russia conducted its normally annual large strategic nuclear exercise. Russia frequently calls it Grom (Thunder in Russian) although this latest exercise was unnamed.

Many announced aspects of it were similar to past Grom exercises, particularly those conducted over the last five years or so. The main target of Russia’s simulated nuclear strikes was almost certainly the United States.

In a program hosted by Dmitry Kiselyov, Russian state television Rossiya 1 (Channel 1) declared the exercise represented, “Nuclear greetings from Putin exactly a week before the U.S. election.”[1] Russia normally avoids doing conducting these exercises before a U.S. election. While they apparently conducted a strategic nuclear exercise in late October 2016, they did not announce it. In 2020, Russia delayed it until December.

According to Kiselyov, “It is important to note that our nuclear triad is the most modern and the most advanced on the planet.”[2] Moreover, he said, “One way or another, the Pentagon could not help but consider the capabilities of our nuclear triad and the readiness to use it in extremis.”[3]

Another program on Rossiya 1 said that “The current training exercise is the fourth of this level in two years.”[4] This apparently counts this year’s non-strategic nuclear exercise but not the large number of smaller Russian single service nuclear exercises. There was also an announced Strategic Missile Forces (ICBM force) exercise in October 2024 and others in July and March.[5]

A program on Moscow’s NTV’s Itogi Nedeli (Results of the Week), said that Putin’s nuclear threats, including his “revision of our nuclear doctrine and a lowering of the threshold for our nuclear response,” were having a de-escalatory effect because, “A nuclear conflict for the sake of Zhytomyr [a city in North West Ukraine] speaking only Ukrainian is clearly not what the West wants.”[6] This is very much the mentality of the Putin regime, which constantly threatens nuclear war. If anything it is less extreme than what is frequently voiced by Deputy Chairman of the Russian National Council and former President Dmitry Medvedev, who even threatened the use of strategic nuclear weapons (presumably against the United States) to “defend” Ukrainian territory Russia had illegally annexed by force.

In 2024, Russia conducted what it called a three-part non-strategic nuclear exercise. This was unprecedented. While Russia reportedly initiates the first use of nuclear weapons in almost all of its theater war military exercises, it had never previously conducted an exercise it characterized as “non-strategic nuclear” (i.e., the focus was on tactical nuclear weapons use). The description of the exercise by the Russian Defense Ministry made it clear that its intent was to practice extensive nuclear warfighting, exploiting the massive disparity in Russia’s favor in tactical nuclear weapons.

Available open source information indicated that in its theater war exercises Russia implemented a nuclear first use threshold “…lower than Russia has ever publicly admitted, according to experts who reviewed and verified the documents.” This is particularly disturbing because even the official Russian nuclear doctrine, released in its most detailed version in June 2020, has the world’s lowest announced nuclear weapons use threshold. Distinguished Russian journalist Pavel Felgenhauer was correct when in 2008 he observed that “…our superiors are potentially ready to burn all of us in nuclear fire because of disputes over ice, rocks or South Ossetia.”

In its October 2024 strategic nuclear exercise, Russia launched three strategic nuclear ballistic missiles (the Yars ICBM, the Bulava-30 SLBM and the Sineva SLBM) and an undisclosed number of strategic nuclear cruise missiles from a Tu-95 MC bomber which carries long-range nuclear cruise missiles. This is normal for Russian strategic nuclear exercises in recent years. The Defense Ministry stated that Russia conducted a “…a massive nuclear strike in response to a nuclear strike by the enemy.” This also is consistent with what Russia said about its last several strategic nuclear exercises and Russian press reports of this go back about two decades. In reality, what Russia was practicing appears to be the final stage of escalation in a nuclear conflict that was almost certainly initiated by Russia in the exercise scenario. President Putin stated, “This exercise will involve practicing the procedures for officials in managing the use of nuclear weapons, including practical launches of ballistic and cruise missiles.” The formulation “managing the use of nuclear weapons” is apparently new in official Russian descriptions of its large strategic nuclear exercises. This appears to be an accurate description of what goes on in Russian strategic nuclear exercises. Russian war games appear not to focus on deterrence but rather on nuclear attack execution.

The amount of detail the Russians made public about its October 2024 strategic nuclear exercise was less than on some of the recent Russian Grom exercises, particularly the 2019 edition. It also provided fewer details than what was released regarding the three-part non-strategic nuclear exercise. The growing Putin dictatorship means there is less information available on its exercises in non-official sources. In its announcement of the Grom-2019 strategic nuclear exercise, Russia released a fairly detailed order of battle of the nuclear forces participating in the exercise. Among other systems, the Russian Defense Ministry said that the exercise involved the majority of Russian ICBM launchers. Then-Russian Defense Minister General of the Army Sergei Shoigu stated that the Grom-2019 exercise employed high-precision nuclear weapons. This is important because it suggests Russian use of very low-yield strategic nuclear weapons as a key element in its strategy of nuclear escalation. Russian state media had reported the introduction of sub-kiloton strategic nuclear missile warheads about a decade before. The October 2024 exercise was probably similar to the Grom-2019 exercise which both ended with the usual “massive” nuclear strike.

In his announcement of the October 2024 exercise, President Putin discussed Russia’s strategic nuclear modernization. He stated:

This year, the modernisation of the strategic deterrence forces’ arsenal has reached approximately 94 percent. In line with the State Armament Programme, we will progressively transition our strategic missile forces to new fixed-site and mobile missile systems, which, compared to previous generations, are more precise, need less pre-launch time, and what’s crucial, have advanced capability to penetrate missile defence systems. Furthermore, the commissioning of the latest nuclear-powered submarine cruisers into the Navy continues, alongside the modernisation of long-range strategic bombers.

This is extremely unusual for a strategic nuclear exercise. Normally, Russia announces its nuclear modernization accomplishments in a Defense Ministry Board meeting held a few days before Christmas. Russian modernization programs are real and in stark contrast to the complete lack of U.S. nuclear delivery vehicle modernization after 1997. In the December 2023 meeting, Putin claimed “…the strategic nuclear forces as a whole has reached 95 percent [modernization], and the naval component – almost 100 percent.” (Minor differences in modernizations numbers are common in Russian statements.) The “submarine cruiser” Putin mentioned was the eighth of the post-Cold War Borei-class ballistic missile submarines and was the fifth of the improved Borei-A class SSBNs.

Why did President Putin speak about Russian nuclear modernization in his announcement of a large strategic nuclear exercise? Russian nuclear exercises have two main purposes: 1) training the troops in nuclear weapons strike execution; and 2) threatening the West in the hope that it will give Russia a political advantage in its confrontation with the democratic nations. The BBC reported that Moscow state television said that Putin’s strategic nuclear training exercise “is perceived as a signal” because the “…statement of our president about the possible use of force, including the nuclear triad, in the event of a threat to our sovereignty and our security, will of course be read.”[7]

The focus of Russian nuclear weapons policy, reflected in its large strategic nuclear exercises, is warfighting not deterrence. Nuclear weapons are its only real claim to superpower status. It is struggling to win a war of aggression against Ukraine, a much smaller and weaker nation. The political clout it obtains from nuclear saber rattling depends on the degree of foreign fear of Russian nuclear weapons. Thus, Russia continually makes numerous types of nuclear threats and its nuclear exercises are intended to intimidate. Putin’s recent announcement of a change in Russian nuclear doctrine (lowering the nuclear use threshold) is another recent example of this policy of intimidation. President Putin seeks to make Russian nuclear weapons as threatening as possible and displays this in its nuclear exercises. For example, Russia staged a large strategic nuclear exercise just before it invaded Ukraine in February 2022. This was followed by the announcement that its nuclear forces were placed on “high alert.”

About a week after the October 2024 strategic nuclear exercise, President Putin threatened the West with Russian nuclear superiority declaring, “I have previously stated that we have reached red lines. The West’s calls to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia, a nation with the largest arsenal of nuclear weapons, reveal the reckless adventurism of certain Western politicians. Such blind faith in their own impunity and exceptionalism could lead to a global catastrophe.”

Western nuclear weapons policy (increasingly dominated by the minimum nuclear deterrence school of thought) empowers Putin. Minimum deterrence advocacy (usually a 500 nuclear warhead deterrent) is quite prevalent in the Western media, despite the fact that in the current context it is grossly inadequate and dangerous. It results in opposition to U.S. nuclear modernization and demands for additional reductions. Indeed, three-quarters of over 200 commentaries on the U.S. nuclear modernization program that appeared in the U.S. press between late 2014 and mid-2017 strongly opposed the Obama Administration’s nuclear modernization program. The Obama Administration’s nuclear program was the minimum required to merely sustain the U.S. nuclear Triad. In fact, the modernization program was much smaller than that of Russia or China. The recent report of the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States concluded that, “The current multi-program, multi-decade U.S. nuclear modernization program is necessary, but not sufficient to enable the nuclear strategy recommended by the Commission to address an unprecedented two-nuclear-peer threat environment.”

The current deterrence situation vis-à-vis Russia is dangerous. Just imagine how much more dangerous it would be if minimum deterrence advocacy had prevailed and the United States now faced Putin’s Russia having between a 10 and 30 fold advantage in nuclear weapons numbers. Moreover, there is also the rapidly growing Chinese nuclear threat. Minimum deterrence advocacy has been based upon extraordinarily pollyannish assumptions. The 2012 report of the Global Zero U.S. Nuclear Policy Commission recommended the reduction of the U.S. nuclear force to 450 nuclear weapons (as a step toward zero) on the assumption that China had only a tiny nuclear force, would not increase it, and that, “The risk of nuclear confrontation between the United States and either Russia or China belongs to the past, not the future….”

Since “nuclear zero” (i.e., zero deterrence) has little chance of being accepted in the West in the foreseeable future, U.S. minimum deterrence is the most favorable outcome that Russia can plausibly hope for. It maximizes the probability that Russia can exploit nuclear threats to advance its agenda and increases the probability that in any major conflict Russia could engage in nuclear escalation. The leaked classified Russian documents obtained by London’s The Financial Times clearly indicate that this is what Russia is practicing in its nuclear exercises.

The deterrence problem goes beyond the disparity in modernization, the current and growing Russian advantage in nuclear weapons numbers and modernization and the growing Chinese nuclear threat. Former STRATCOM commander Admiral (ret.) Charles Richard and Robert Peters of the Heritage Foundation have stated:

Both authors have facilitated or directly observed numerous wargames and table top exercises. In one exercise, senior military officers—almost all general officers or flag officers—emulated a national security council advising the Blue president in the face of Red aggression against a non-treaty partner. When Red employed a limited number of low-yield nuclear weapons against the Blue partner, the players decided neither to escalate the level of violence nor expand the conflict—nor did they choose to respond in kind, for fear of being perceived as too escalatory. (Emphasis in the original.)

When dealing with the likes of President Putin, failure to respond in-kind to Russian nuclear first use would likely result in further Russian nuclear escalation and a historic defeat of the United States. Even the fanatic militarist regime in World War II Japan recognized that it was impossible to fight a conventional war while absorbing nuclear attacks.

In addition, Admiral Richard and Peters noted the American military’s “…loss of focus on the goal they ostensibly should be most focused upon: victory.” They further observed that “…once a conflict begins, revisionist powers will continue to employ force so long as they: 1) are able to sustain force; 2) see a pathway to victory; and, 3) do not pay costs that outweigh the benefits of the objective they seek once they create a new status quo.” The nuclear dimension of this is vital. Russian strategy is based on their conclusion that nuclear weapons “…are capable of nullifying the combat qualities of all modern conventional systems.” Russia’s theory of victory is based on the belief that the United States would not retaliate in-kind in response to Russia’s nuclear first use. Russia calls this strategy “escalate to de-escalate.” In 2017, then-DIA Director Lieutenant General Vincent Stewart stated Russia is “…the only country that I know of that has this concept of escalate to terminate or escalate to deescalate but they do have that built into their operational concept, we’ve seen them exercise that idea and it’s really kind of a dangerous idea…”[8] The 2024 Russian non-strategic nuclear exercise appears to have been practicing to defeat NATO through protracted nuclear warfighting in which sub-kiloton nuclear weapons are substituted for precision conventional weapons.

The minimum deterrence mentality maximizes the chance that Russia will initiate the use of nuclear weapons and that the Russian conclusion about the combat utility of its nuclear weapons would be proven true. The current U.S. military is obsessed with limiting collateral damage even at the expense of losing. Putin’s Russia could care less about killing civilians and even appears to inflict civilian casualties deliberately.

Russian emphasis on massive nuclear strikes in its descriptions of its large strategic nuclear exercises appears aimed at generating fear in the West that could prevent retaliation in-kind against an initial small low-yield nuclear strike. Russian state television, which Putin controls, reinforces the belief that Russia benefits politically from its nuclear threats and urges it to initiate the use of nuclear weapons against Ukraine and even NATO as well as the United States. Russia never hears from Western leaders what will happen to Russia (and to Putin himself whose survival he highly values) if it executes a “massive” nuclear strike against the West. Putin very much needs to hear this. Specifically, he must be made to believe 1) there will be an in-kind nuclear response against Russian low-yield nuclear strikes and that 2) if he initiates an all-out nuclear war, his deep hardened underground bunkers will not keep him alive. The Biden Administration’s 2022 Nuclear Posture Review created the opposite impression since it sought to eliminate the most effective U.S. weapons against such facilities. This degraded deterrence at a very dangerous time. The deficiency in the U.S.’ nuclear deterrent is reflected in Russia’s nuclear exercises. Hopefully, the new Trump Administration will enhance deterrence. The United States should be thinking about how to maximize deterrence rather than waging endless expensive no-win wars.

Dr. Mark B. Schneider is a Senior Analyst with the National Institute for Public Policy. Before his retirement from the Department of Defense Senior Executive Service, Dr. Schneider served as Principal Director for Forces Policy, Principal Director for Strategic Defense, Space and Verification Policy, Director for Strategic Arms Control Policy and Representative of the Secretary of Defense to the Nuclear Arms Control Implementation Commissions. He also served in the senior Foreign Service as a Member of the State Department Policy Planning Staff.