Russia’s Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine Has Permanently Altered U.S. and European Security
The following article summarizes a chapter from the 2025 International Security Seminar Report at the U.S. Military Academy that analyzes Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine since 2022 and its impact on U.S. and European national security (Chapter 8 of the report). The full section, as well as the other contents of the 2025 International Security Seminar Report for the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, can be found here.
The International Security Seminar at the United States Military Academy at West Point brings together military officers, government officials, policymakers, and academics to examine major challenges to global security. The seminar represents 14 topic-driven, transdisciplinary working groups that seek to “better understand critical economic, political, social, and technological questions at the heart of strategy.” The findings from the working groups are then compiled into a conference report. The first report was used in support of the development of NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept. Since then, the annual West Point report has been prepared for the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was also distributed to the Office of the NATO Secretary General and other members of the intelligence community. This article highlights the findings of the section from the 2025 report, published in February 2026, that analyzed Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and its impact on U.S. and European national security.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has driven the most significant military rearmament in Europe since the end of the Cold War. What began as a rapid invasion aimed at seizing Kyiv exposed serious weaknesses in NATO’s industrial capacity and readiness. Russia’s war in Ukraine also forced the U.S. and Europe to rethink defense spending, force posture, and the division of responsibilities inside the Alliance.
For example, the fighting in Ukraine revealed a severe shortage of munitions. At the start of the war, Ukrainian forces were firing thousands of artillery shells per day. Western defense industries struggled to keep pace with this rate of fire. Meanwhile, Russia increased its own production and sought additional supplies from partners such as North Korea, Iran, and China. This imbalance placed pressure on European governments to expand production lines and rebuild stockpiles.
As a result, Germany announced a large defense fund and began investing heavily in its arms industry. Meanwhile, Poland increased defense spending and purchased significant quantities of equipment from abroad, and the Baltic states raised their budgets and focused on air defense in response to Russian strikes on critical infrastructure in Ukraine.
These changes reflect a wider shift inside NATO. Before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, only six NATO member states met the Alliance’s target for defense spending as a share of gross domestic product. Now, 23 out of NATO’s 32 members have met the overall defense spending target, and 29 allies have met the equipment spending target (20% of defense budgets). Additionally, Finland and Sweden joined the Alliance, bringing capable armed forces that have strengthened NATO’s security in northern and eastern Europe. Elsewhere, France’s nuclear deterrent and the United Kingdom’s naval and air capabilities have remained central to European defense.
Ukraine has also become an important security partner to the U.S. and Europe. Ukraine’s experience with drones, long-range strike systems, and integrated air defense has provided valuable lessons for NATO planners. At the same time, some allies are still behind on artillery, air defense, and high-end munitions. Should Europe wish to sustain its defense deterrence, then the Europeans must continue to increase production and replenish their stockpiles.
For the United States, the war in Ukraine has confirmed the importance of encouraging greater European responsibility for its own defense. European governments have committed hundreds of billions of euros to new defense spending since 2022. This should allow the United States to devote more attention and resources to the Indo-Pacific. European forces, however, still depend on the U.S. for critical enabling capabilities. These include intelligence, surveillance, logistics, airlift, and certain advanced munitions and aircraft. As a result, NATO allies and partners should deepen cooperation on co-production and joint procurement. Additionally, there should be clear measures of readiness that focus on real capabilities and on the ability to respond quickly to crises, rather than on simple spending targets.
The Russian Federation’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has also shown how new technologies can change the character of war. Ukraine’s use of drones, electronic warfare, and precision strikes has forced both Russia and NATO to adapt. The Alliance should learn from Ukraine’s usage of new technologies, equipment, and combat operations in its defense against Russia’s invasion, and NATO should integrate Ukraine’s successes into its own defense planning. The usage of drones and other technological capabilities highlights the importance of secure communications, resilient logistics, and the protection of civilian infrastructure.
All of this has taken place against a complex political backdrop. Russia has signaled that it remains willing to bear high costs in pursuit of its goals in Ukraine. Western leaders have pledged continued support for Kyiv, but there are debates in some capitals about the scale and duration of that support. Any perception of Western fatigue could encourage further Russian aggression. As a result, to ensure a fully stable and peaceful European continent, the United States, the European Union, and NATO should continue to focus heavily on strengthening their defense capabilities and stockpiles. Additionally, sustained military assistance to Ukraine and long-term commitments to European defense will signal to the Kremlin that renewed Russian offensives in Ukraine will fail.
In short, the Russian Federation’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has ended the post-Cold War era in European security. It has taken time, but European states are now slowly beginning to spend more on defense as they also rebuild their armed forces.
NATO is larger and, in many ways, stronger, but it still faces gaps in munitions, readiness, and enabling capabilities. The choices that Washington, European capitals, and Kyiv make in the coming years will determine whether this rearmament leads to lasting deterrence and stability, or whether Europe will face renewed cycles of crisis and war.
Mark Temnycky is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a freelance journalist covering Eurasian affairs.
Isak Kulalic is a research and administrative assistant at Georgetown University. He holds an MA in international affairs from Boston University.
Dr. Robert Person is a Professor of International Relations at the United States Military Academy and the Director of West Point’s curriculum in International Affairs. He is also a nonresident senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s Eurasia Program.
The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not represent the official policy or position of the Army, Department of Defense, or U.S. government.