Rename the South China Sea

The recent National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy outline the Trump Administration’s bold vision to keep America strong and focused on the regions that matter most. They emphasize defending our own hemisphere, avoiding endless conflicts in the Middle East, and advancing a free and open Indo-Pacific, including the strategically vital South China Sea.

The National Security Strategy makes clear why the South China Sea must remain free of domination by any hostile power, and the need for international cooperation to keep it that way. As one-third of global maritime commerce passes through these waters, its security is central to the economic well-being of the United States and the world, thus proving what the strategy rightly calls “one of the world’s most vital lanes of commerce.”

Taken together, the strategies reveal a key opportunity: the U.S. and its allies should rename the South China Sea.

The name itself is a tacit endorsement of China’s illegal claims of ownership and cedes huge diplomatic and psychological advantage to Beijing. The current name reinforces China’s narrative that this vast maritime expanse somehow belongs to it, despite competing claims of five other nations and the 2016 ruling of an international tribunal rejecting China’s vast territorial claims under the legally dubious “nine-dash line.”

A new, geographically neutral name would help break China’s narrative.

What should replace it? “The Friendship Sea.” The term is geographically neutral and aligned with the President’s vision for a sea highway that is open, safe, and free from hostile control. It also translates easily across regional languages, enabling broad adoption by other nations. Even countries with their own territorial or maritime claims could adopt the name without ceding legal ground.

Renaming the sea will signal America’s commitment, while offering our allies and partners a symbolic tool to resist China’s long campaign of militarization and coercive behavior in the region. It would also give the world a unifying term to counter Beijing’s expanding influence in the information space, including frequent controversy in film and media made to bolster China’s claims.

The waterway (or various parts of it) is already known by a medley of names, many that seek to bolster specific national claims. For example, the Philippines uses Karagatang Kanlurang Pilipinas or East Sea; Vietnam uses Biển Đông or West Sea; while Indonesia’s overlapping exclusive economic zone is known as the Laut Natuna Utara or North Natuna Sea. Even China and Taiwan use Nánhǎi or South Sea.

The language is fragmented, and Beijing benefits from the confusion. A globally recognized, geographically neutral name will signal that the United States and the world will no longer cede diplomatic space or language to a China that seeks to dominate global sea lanes.

The President has already demonstrated his authority to rename geographic features by directing the federal government to rename the Gulf of Mexico as the Gulf of America. Similarly, he can direct the U.S. Board on Geographic Names to adopt a new name. Should interagency representatives on the board resist, the President can direct his cabinet secretaries to replace them. Once the United States and its partners begin using a new name consistently, a world eager to resist China’s threats will likely follow.

Renaming the sea will not resolve the region’s many disputes or end China’s aggression. But it would be a simple, yet powerful act that challenges China’s expansive claims and underscores American leadership in a region of critical strategic and economic importance.


John Erik Anderson is a U.S. Army Foreign Area Officer specializing in Southeast Asia. He most recently served as the senior U.S. military representative to the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste.

The views expressed are the author’s own and do not represent those of the Department of War or the U.S. government.