Do Not Sacrifice Marines and Sailors on the Altar of Expediency
Anyone who has experienced the horrors of war at sea will affirm that the quality of ships and the protection of their crews must always take precedence over cost and speed of procurement. The United States has always recognized its solemn obligation to protect the lives of American servicemen and women. It is unthinkable that a great nation would ever shirk from this commitment for the sake of expediency. But the Navy and Marine Corps are doing just that.
For over six years, the Marine Corps has pursued a low-cost Landing Ship Medium (LSM) to support operations in the Western Pacific. Congress has recently obliged the Marines, and the Navy will build at least nine non-developmental (i.e., already existing) vessels to support Marine requirements. None of these ships will be built to Navy survivability standards, as codified in Navy Instructions. The Marines wanted the ships fast and cheap. The Navy shockingly agreed.
In early December 2025, the Navy announced the selection of the Damen Dutch Landing Ship Transport 100 (LST 100) as the non-developmental variant for the LSM. Except for having a double hull, these ships are like the U.S. Army’s Besson-class Logistics Support Vessels (LSVs) in terms of lacking speed, self-defense, and survivability from enemy attack. They are not built to operate in contested areas during hostilities. They will not survive.
The Commandant of the Marine Corps and Chief of Naval Operations released a social media clip on December 5th extolling the virtues of the LST 100 with lofty words such as mobility, maintainability, repairability, maneuverability, affordability, and reduced technical risk. Nowhere was survivability mentioned. According to the Commandant, these large, slow, and lightly armed vessels meet Marine Corps requirements for “providing needed mobility within an adversary’s Weapons Engagement Zone.”
And therein is the rub. These vessels are being procured to support Marine Corps Stand-in Forces (SIFs), which are isolated and widely separated small units envisioned to operate “within a contested area as the leading edge of a maritime defense in depth.” These isolated units are exposed and vulnerable to attack. U.S. Navy surface combatants, with greater stealth, mobility, lethality, and survivability would be at significant risk operating forward in contested areas until threat weapons have been neutralized or greatly reduced. The U.S. Navy knows this and has no intention of exposing their carriers, cruisers, destroyers, or large amphibious ships to unnecessary risk. But the LSM is apparently fair game since the Marine Corps intends to use it to resupply, reposition, and logistically support the SIFs, including the evacuation of dead and wounded.
So how does a large, slow, and lightly armed ship survive in this environment? It can’t and Marine and Navy leaders know it. In a refreshing moment of candor, the previous Commanding General of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command admitted the obvious when he stated, that as war nears the LSM “goes into hiding, it goes into bed-down somewhere. Nowhere do we envision the [LSM] out transiting the sea lanes in the middle of a kinetic fight.”
Yet, decisions taken by the current and previous Marine Commandants regarding the concept of employment for the LSM place Navy crews and embarked Marines at grave risk during hostilities. The Marines will almost exclusively rely on the LSM to provide essential support to Marine units dispersed across the Western Pacific in a war with China. But if LSMs are not survivable inside contested areas, then neither are the Marines who depend upon them for mobility, logistics, and a means of escape.
Before sending our sons and daughters into combat on these vessels, the Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps need to answer two questions to Congress and the American people: (1) have these ships been built to U.S. Navy survivability standards and if not, why not? and (2) how can the LSM survive inside contested areas when the presumption is that other Navy surface ships cannot?
Sailors and embarked Marines must not be sent to war on ships that are not fit for purpose. The mothers and fathers of America will not stand for it. The Secretary of the Navy and Members of the SASC and HASC need to reevaluate decisions that led to this dangerous situation.
General Charles Krulak (U.S. Marine Corps, ret.) was a career infantry officer who commanded Marines at every level, including Marine Corps Forces Pacific and the Marine Corps Combat Development Command. His last assignment was the 31st Commandant of the Marine Corps.
General James Conway (U.S. Marine Corps, ret.) was a career infantry officer who commanded Marines at every level, including the I Marine Expeditionary Force during Operation Iraqi Freedom. His last assignment was the 34thCommandant of the Marine Corps.
RADM Leonard Picotte was a career surface warfare officer who commanded four ships, including the USS Marathon (PG-89) in Vietnam and the USS Wasp (LHD-1). His final sea tour was Commander, Amphibious Group Two, in Norfolk, Virginia.