Canada’s Better Alternative to the Golden Dome
In May of 2025 U.S. President Donald Trump stated that Canada could either pay US$61bn to US$71bn (Can$100bn) for a third of the Golden Dome missile defense architecture, or for free if Canada becomes the 51st state, or risk not being protected. Trump’s 3-year timeline and US$175bn cost was challenged by the U.S. General Accounting Office which estimated US$263bn to US$830bn over 20 years, but only half of that if launch costs continue to decline. The Golden Dome is intended to build-upon the ground-based interceptors (GBI) intended to intercept ICBMs, with air-based surveillance, controversially, by F-35s and UAV (Uncrewed Aerial Vehicles), and thousands of laser-communicating interceptor-satellites, and some estimates put the cost at beyond US$1trn, primarily because of the size of North America.
The Pentagon linked Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s ambivalence over the Golden Dome proposals with its decision to pause the U.S.-Canada Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD), although the PM’s office has not discounted participation in 2026. According to Nicholas Glesby, as part of its 2022 NORAD modernization program, Ottawa is procuring tracking systems to enable the interception of hypersonic missiles and stealth drones. Alex Filip has shown that Canada does indeed have vulnerable energy infrastructure that may be the target of strategic coercion. Contrary to critics of NORAD, missile threats to Canada remain.
We propose more cost effective aerospace defense architecture for Canada, termed Canadian Aerospace Defense Command (CANAD), with an operational target date of 2031. It is designed to monitor aircraft in Canada’s ADIZ (air identification zone), intercept unintended, unsanctioned third-party, or small volley missile launches, typified by North Korea or India’s accidental Brahmos launch. The system must also satisfy multiple U.S. administrations that Canada is contributing to North American security, protect Canada’s political and military decision-making authorities, and finally it must protect Canadians. We estimate a total cost of Can$50bn (itemized at this link), which is far cheaper than the reconstruction costs of a single destroyed medium-sized Canadian city. We exclude from this cost the dual-use aircraft interceptors like the CF-18, F-35 and the reported future procurement of Gripen, which are not exclusively tasked to NORAD missions. This program has the following constituent parts:
CANAD, responsible for a parallel coordination function to NORAD (similar to the U.S. structure in DEFSMAC) would be headquartered at a re-commissioned underground command center at CFB North Bay. This presumes the RCAF grows it personnel size to meet the new additional requirements. Air breathing and space threats are detected either via NORAD data, or the new Canadian based capabilities, with exo-atmospheric missile tracking by TERRA ELM-2090U/S radars, the Canadian BMEWS system anchored at CFB Shilo, Cambridge Bay, Tofino, Gander and Yellowknife. Comprehensive Canadian airspace surveillance is accomplished by RCAF airfields and NWS (Northern Warning Station) sites equipped with a networked ELM-2288ER AD-Star radar system (450 km+ coverage) Additionally, 2 more JORN OTH B (Over The Horizon Backscatter) radars looking east and west, located at Suffield and Bagotville (one is already purchased from Australia, which we would propose moving to Yellowknife, and we excluded from our cost analysis as it was already budgeted). The precise capabilities of the JORN are classified, but each can scan a wide arc, which will reach somewhere past the North Pole and far out to sea on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, giving operators a clear picture of the surface and air within their coverage. The deployment location and anticipated costs of each of these systems is displayed at this link. This surveillance capacity would require an estimated investment of an estimated $12 billion for infrastructure overhead.
The IAI Elta ELM-2288ER radar system is a reliable, state of the art airspace monitoring system with a detection range out to 450km for fighter-sized, and 600km for larger aircraft, and has dual air traffic control (ATC) ability. The ten proposed new Northern Warning Stations stretch from Tuktoyaktuk NWT to Eureka NU to Voisey’s Bay on the Atlantic. For missile tracking, allowing for long range dual phenomenology, we propose that Canada spend Can$6.25 billion to purchase five sets of the Israeli Terra ELM-2090 U/S dual band missile detecting radars to be installed at bases built at Tofino BC. (Radar Hill), Gander NL., Yellowknife NWT., CFB Shilo Mb., and CFB Cambridge Bay NU.
This new radar package would give Canada a complete and 360° radar view of the sea, air and space around it for thousands of km, which is important to identifying and tracking all threats, like FOBS (Fractional orbital Bombardment System), and offshore SLCM (Submarine-Launched Cruise Missiles), Shahed style drones, or another Chinese balloon affair. These systems can identify and track plasma-enveloped hypersonics, discriminate exo-atmospheric decoys, track stealth drones, stealth aircraft, and detect at-sea launches from submarines and civilian ships. An important note: many of the systems we selected are Israeli in design and have a history of co-operation in joint production like with India.
We chose them primarily because of their demonstrated cost-effectiveness, technical sophistication and capabilities, and the fit with Canadian needs. Additionally, the proven track record of licensing, assisting domestic industries gain expertise. NATO allies have also acquired a number of these Israeli systems, including Slovakia with the Barak MX, and Germany purchasing the Arrow-3 ABM which became operational in December of 2025. Canada has previously purchased the ELM-2084 MMR.
Canada’s upper atmosphere would be defended by seven Arrow-3 ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) batteries (of 3 launchers with 18 missiles each), to be placed at Comox, Yellowknife, Cambridge Bay, Winnipeg, Iqaluit, North Bay, and Goose Bay, each battery comes with an integral ELM-2080S Green Pine guidance radar. The Arrow-3 is a battle proven exo-atmospheric kill vehicle with a reported 2,400 km engagement range and 200km engagement height. Purchasing seven batteries with 126 missiles will cost only Can$14bn, not the US $170 billion to deploy 44 missiles as with the US GBI.
Terminal point missile interception and comprehensive Canadian area air defense, long a neglected capability in Canada can be accomplished by deploying 29 BARAK ER MX SAM batteries (Surface to Air Missiles), comprising 48 Barak-8ER missiles each equipped with an integral ELM-2084 MMR radar, costing Can$13bn in aggregate. The Barak8 ER has a 150km slant range, active homing radar, can engage ballistic threats up to 20km in altitude, and is fully networked and state of the art. These will be distributed nationwide at select Canadian Forces Bases and Installations as indicated in this link.
The aforementioned investment totals Can$50 billion for the complete package and excludes overhead and future maintenance. We did not include cost of other aerial sensors and aircraft interceptors into the total because they are dual use and not exclusive to Canadian continental defense, which is what the “Golden Dome” is about. We expect that the total government purchase of aircraft will be for 30 to 45 F-35s and 70 to 80 Gripen fighters, based on reporting. It is also recently reported that Canada is looking to buy up to 36 Leonardo M-346 trainer aircraft. Canada could reasonably stand up 2-to-3 F-35 and 3-to-4 operational Gripen squadrons to provide interceptor and NATO and coalition alliance air support given these numbers. While wholly inadequate to fulfill all Canada’s needs and less than what we have advocated for previously, it is an important interceptor supplement to NORAD.
We would also recommend that MDA be contracted to build three Space Based Infrared System Satellites for the RCAF, to detect rocket launches (equivalent of SBIRS, at a cost of Can$1.8bn), as well as two U.S.-Pattern Key Hole reconnaissance satellites, and launch them via the European Space Agency for no more than Can$20bn, to give Canada a comprehensive independent and complimentary spaced based launch detection and reconnaissance ability alongside our NORAD partner.
This alternate defense architecture for NORAD provides a cost-effective multi-layered porcupine defense that best protects Canada’s wide landmass. Canada once possessed significant aerospace defense expertise, with nuclear-armed Bomarc-missiles and interceptors. For $70bn including satellites rather than $100bn, Ottawa can buy an extraordinary amount of independent capability, while advancing Canada’s goal of diversifying and strengthening its own defense industry and fending off human capital flight to the U.S. This proposal still greatly strengthens NORAD and continental security, while giving Canada an autonomous and significant ability to meet current and future threats it faces. It is reasonable, doable and makes economic and military sense.
Raymond Floreani (BA Econ) had a 30-year management career in the private sector and is currently studying graduate level law.
Dr. Julian Spencer-Churchill is associate professor of international relations at Concordia University, and author of Militarization and War (2007) and of Strategic Nuclear Sharing (2014). He has published extensively on Pakistan security issues and arms control and completed research contracts at the Office of Treaty Verification at the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, and the then Ballistic Missile Defense Office (BMDO). He has also conducted fieldwork in Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Egypt, and Taiwan, and is a consultant. He is a former Operations Officer, 3 Field Engineer Regiment, from the latter end of the Cold War to shortly after 9/11. He is currently collaborating with the Combat Modelling group at the Trevor Dupuy Institute.