America’s Blind Spot: Ignore Africa, and Cede the 21st Century to China

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Africa is no longer a peripheral theater but the decisive arena where the United States will either reset a broken relationship and reclaim strategic relevance—or cede the future to China’s entrenched, long-game presence on the continent. America’s diplomatic engagements with Africa have historically been characterized as episodic and self-serving, although Africa is one of the world’s last frontiers of critical development with significant strategic implications. This tacit relationship developed during the Transatlantic Slave Trade in the 16th century and remains relevant today. Behavior gives credence to the underlying unresolved racial tensions and misunderstood political and cultural complexities of the continent. Policymakers have historically prioritized other regions of the world based on confirmed pacing threats, while largely ignoring Africa, which created a power vacuum for rogue actors and known adversaries. The United States’ inconsistent diplomatic engagement with Africa continues to reflect enduring racial tensions and a persistent misreading of the continent’s political and cultural complexity, contributing to a steady decline in America’s strategic influence as China consolidates a more structured and durable presence across the continent.

Historical Background

Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade through the Cold War

The often-unspoken truth and proverbial “elephant in the room” is that U.S.-African relations are plagued by a history of mistrust and greed, as the cornerstone engagements rest on the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade (TAST) and the Cold War. The slave trade was a horrific practice with over 36,000 voyages to the Americas that human trafficked more than 12.5M Africans, with just under 500K direct transports to North America and many indirect transports from the Caribbean Islands.1 The opinions of Africans are shaped by TAST, the Middle Passage, where ~3M Africans perished from disease, suicide, rape, and torture,2 and the continued mistreatment of Black Americans well past the era of the slave trade and into the Cold War era continues to color perspectives on both sides. Americans’ opinions are shaped by the same and more recent friction, like the Rwandan Genocide, the Sudanese Coup and genocide, the Battle of Mogadishu, Nairobi, Kenya – U.S. Embassy bombing, consistent famine and unrest across the African continent. The modern-day unrest rose with WWI as French, British, Belgian, Italian, Portuguese, and German colonial powers forced countries to the front lines both in Africa and abroad to feed their war machines, resulting in over ~2M African deaths.3 Furthermore, colonial powers redrew country boundaries and transitioned ownership due to the redistribution of German colonies to satisfy Allied desires with little consideration of African cultures, politics, and economics.4 These decisions continue to reverberate in modern Africa.

Non-interventionism no longer served the geopolitical interests and stability of the U.S., thus propelling them into the international power struggles of WWI. Though they did not directly operate on the African continent, this war gave rise to the morality of colonialism discussion and President Wilson’s Fourteen Points as a response to the Soviets’ proposal in October 1917 to an immediate conclusion of peace.5 Fast forward, the U.S. emerged as the sole remaining superpower following World War II, with Russia and China trailing in second and third place, respectively. The unexpected ascendance of the United States in 1945—achieved through decisive military and political actions—conferred upon it unparalleled influence, power, and diplomatic leverage, enabling American leaders to broker agreements, forge alliances, and construct security frameworks that would safeguard national interests and the American way of life for decades to come. However, China and Russia remained geopolitical adversaries who competed for the same resources and influence in different corners of the world, particularly on the “forgotten” continent of Africa. Interestingly enough, the “focused spark” for equality and nationalism began during WWII as colonizers across Africa again sought personnel and resource support from African Nations, now promising some form of liberation that was not upheld after the war.6

The Cold War engagements in Africa were proxy wars fought in competition with Russia and China, creating the next major mental obelisk in the minds of stakeholders. Thomas Tieku, a prolific author in the field of African Studies, believes that Africa provided a locale for the United States and the Soviet Union to act out their global struggles.7 This era gave way to the Atlantic Charter and America’s concept of national self-determination that intentionally fanned the sparks into flames of African Nationalism and the demand for decolonization.8 China aligned itself as an ally with newly independent African states, finding solidarity in expelling colonial and minority rule.9 The United States conceptualized its involvement in African affairs primarily as a means to counter the global spread of communism. Americans targeted Russian expansion and Chinese meddling in hopes of containing communism.10 “U.S. relations with Africa did not go beyond nurturing, promoting, and maintaining anti-communist ideas amongst African elites during the Cold War era.”11 Though the U.S. Army Southern European Task Force (SETAF) was established in 1955, it remained in Italy and was considered a logistical command that responded to crises between Europe and Africa when required.12 Thus, the U.S.-Africa relationships were shallow and self-serving, leaving Africans wanting without suitable guides and resources to help them towards the U.S. ideal of governance, democratization, after centuries of colonial ravaging. The U.S. even flip-flopped on its strategy at times, partnering with communists and bad actors to counteract proclaimed adversaries. Instead of the U.S. deepening geopolitical relationships and helping to usher in stability, China filled the gaps with no-strings-attached loans and humanitarian aid, asking only for the respect for China’s core sovereignty interests.13

Modern Day

The United States remains uncommitted to a strong African alliance and seems uninterested in brokering peace across the continent of Africa. However, they have chosen to have an enduring footprint in Djibouti, the Horn of Africa. Camp Lemonnier, home of Combined Joint Task Force-HOA, was established in 2002 because of the War on Terrorism and its strategically positioned location on one of the world’s busiest shipping routes through Bab el Mandeb Strait and the Suez Canal.14 The command hierarchy has undergone multiple restructurings due to the consistent re-evaluation of the return on investment. The most significant decision was not placing U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) headquarters, created in 2007, on the African continent, but instead in Stuttgart, Germany. Since 2020, SETAF has become SETAF-Africa (SETAF-AF), focusing on tactical operations as the theater reaction force. Then, in 2021, AFRICOM, alongside U.S. European Command (EUCOM), consolidated under the U.S. Army Europe and Africa (USAREUR-AF) command, making it the largest Army Service Component Command (ASCC).15 The combining of these combatant commands seems problematic as Africa is the 2nd largest continent after Asia and Europe is three times smaller,16 but the U.S. is more vested, creating a potential capacity issue resulting from the tyranny of distance and two very different problem sets. Additionally, EUCOM has Arctic oversight responsibilities and is currently facing increased geopolitical friction. However, the United States and USAREUR-AF are meeting the immediate challenge and does view Camp Lemonnier as a crisis response outpost, as seen during the 2023 evacuation of the U.S. Embassy in Sudan.17 The U.S. also negotiated a 20-year lease in 2014 for facilities and over 1,000 jobs for Host Nation Nationals while doubling the annual payment to $63M to counter Russian efforts.18 Growing concern over Chinese influence and restrictions come with more focused CJTF-HOA Operations, Activities, and Initiatives (OAIs) that are militarily and socially based in attempts to own the information operations (IO) space.

Though Africans still have a positive perspective on the U.S. and they remain hopeful, history and modern-day agreements continue to reaffirm an incoherent strategy that focuses on security partnerships and counter-terrorism.19 During the Obama era, policy waned in Africa due to the common episodic approach that was counter or partial to what African countries desired: economic stability, prosperity, and infrastructure development.20 However, China continues to operate freely on the continent, leveraging relationships built during the Cold War, while expanding its reach through infrastructure projects, loans, military training, and humanitarian aid. While the U.S. built security cooperation structures within Africa, China leveraged Africa’s longing for attention, relevance, and economic growth through the tri-annual Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) established in 2003.21 China also established its first and only outstation located in Djibouti, Africa. The location of their coastal installation is strategic, creating maritime leverage due to direct access to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Suez Canal. A major concern for multiple African nations is the prevalence of geographically landlocked states in arid climates, making Chinese partnerships and imports even more critical. Additionally, China does not force ideology, politics, or economics on the countries it partners with, but instead respects self-determination, while providing resources, training, and guidance. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) created in 2013 expands their global reach, builds deeper partnerships, and reinvigorates the old Silk Road route.2223 Africa and China are now also tied in security interests that directly affect U.S. relations, such as their stake in one or more terminals in ports of 30 different African countries.24 The Mombasa port, Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway, Addis Ababa African Union Headquarters, lines of communication in multiple states, and energy investments are a few of the strategic investments that continue to outpace the U.S..25 Additionally, China’s loan approach, which topped $28.4 billion in 2016, often ends in default by African states, further entwining the country with them. However, African nations consider the loans mutually beneficial and continue to borrow from China. Finally, China is Africa’s largest importer of goods due to cheap product development, and China imports large quantities of crude oil and rare earth minerals (cobalt, copper, etc.) from Africa to further its technological competitive advantage.26

Recommendations

Create an enduring, logical, and mutually beneficial strategy for U.S.-Africa relations by transforming the policy from episodic, security-first engagements to a long-term, co-created partnerships that balance stability, African prosperity, competition with China, and National security interests.

  1. Strategy and Command Architecture
  • The U.S. should re-establish a standalone ASCC to specifically support U.S. AFRICOM as a combatant command and locate AFRICOM headquarters on the African continent to foster solidarity and good faith, thus conveying the U.S.’s commitment to African success and stability.
  • The continent should be divided into four to five operational regions with a U.S. or allied headquarters for command and control of rotating units, reducing the tyranny of distance and allowing more persistent, tailored engagement with regional organizations and states.

One U.S. camp in Djibouti and special operators working Foreign Internal Defense (FID) operations in different countries are not enough to support the development of sound governance from political leaders to local police while gaining and maintaining security; a distributed regional architecture is required due to the complexity of the continent. Additionally, creating more stability on the African continent also decreases the vulnerability of the U.S. Eastern Front and shields the capital from bad actors with munitions that could reach American shores.

  1. DIMEC as the Central Organizing Framework

U.S. policy should be framed as a DIMEC strategy co-developed with African partners, with metrics of success based on achievements (governance, economic growth, stability, human development) rather than arbitrary timelines.

  • Diplomatic: The U.S. should establish credible, sustained partnerships across African regions. The most critical work should be the creation of a new collaborative organization across Africa or help further shape the African Union to be inclusive and operate similarly to NATO, creating partnerships for sustained peace and growth throughout Africa and around the world.

The U.S. must seek to understand how successful socialist and authoritarian societies operate prior to mandating democracy across Africa. The Department of State must lead this effort as the federal government agency with the training and experience to facilitate sustained progress. However, this mission should be resourced (Funds, People, Infrastructure) to execute it effectively.

  • Information: The U.S. should develop robust information operations (IO) to counter adversarial influence from China, Russia, and terrorist groups. Control the narrative to emphasize the U.S. commitment to African prosperity and security. The U.S. must own the information hub of Africa in the sense of becoming the most trusted, transparent, and responsive source of information, and provide information operations in everything it does. Owning the story will provide psychological influence on all stakeholders, but specifically to Russia and terrorist organizations who are seeking legitimacy.27

Strategic communications and public diplomacy should emphasize African agency and mutual benefit, rather than focusing solely on crisis response or great-power competition.

  • Military: The U.S. should permanently station AFRICOM on the continent, divided into multiple operational regions to increase responsiveness and regional integration (4-5 regions, based on size and bad actors). Enhance security partnerships beyond episodic counterterrorism and crisis action to support the development of sustainable governance, law enforcement, and regional peace initiatives across Africa. Military presence should not be an occupation or recolonization but should be based on sustained regional threats and partnership for an age of stability, peace, and the rule of law.
  • Economic: The U.S. should fully support commercial investment, infrastructure development, and trade that align with African and U.S. priorities, leveraging competitive U.S. advantages in technology, education, and innovation. Create State mutually beneficial deals concerning minerals and energetics that support national interests. The U.S. should encourage commercial business operations in Africa, specifically expanding the capabilities of the defense industrial base. There should be an expansion of work and school visas to ensure exposure to the American way of life, and re-establishment of U.S. agencies with developmental tools that also offer credible and transparent alternatives to predatory loans, training, and continued development, while respecting African agency.

The U.S. should promote African entrepreneurship, focusing on sectors such as energy, digital infrastructure, climate resilience, and value-added processing of critical minerals.2829

  • Cultural: The U.S. should address the legacy of racial and elitist misconceptions by fostering cultural exchange, educational programs, and research to deepen American understanding of Africa’s diverse identities and challenges. This will help avoid the continued view of Africa as a monolith, instead presenting it as a collection of separate and distinct states with unique colonial and tribal legacies that must inform policy design for future trust and stability.

The U.S. must conduct research to understand complex countries and regions, considering their colonial and tribal influences, including arbitrary borders; this research should produce metrics of success based on DIMEC pre-established and mutually agreed achievements, rather than timelines.

This process will take time, but China has already demonstrated that it can be accomplished with a partial plan that, in recent years, has been on full display through its Belt and Road initiative. Creating a solid DIMEC strategy will not only keep African countries focused but will also provide a tangible direction for the U.S. to secure and maintain security on the U.S. Eastern Front, while helping to secure the Southwestern Flank of Europe.

  1. Working with and Competing with China

U.S. and China’s interests are unequivocally intertwined in Africa, as China has a lasting relationship with Africa and has built trust over decades with multiple states, if not centuries, of trade and partnership.303132 However, Africa remains in awe of the U.S., respects the military, and appreciates the quality work when partnered with America; this creates space for a pragmatic, interest-based approach to competition.

  • The U.S. should continue offering higher-quality, transparent, and sustainable economic and infrastructure partnerships, creating a values-based approach over quantity. However, there must be a more efficient and timely delivery of assets or projects to African countries.
  • Where interests align, the U.S. should carefully explore scoped trilateral cooperation (U.S.-China-Africa) in areas such as climate resilience, health, and food security, while protecting critical infrastructure, data, and mineral supply chains central to U.S. national security.333435

Conclusion

In conclusion, the diplomatic relationship with Africa has been inconsistent and self-serving, diminishing America’s value proposition on the continent, while near-peer competitors, such as China, continue to expand their geopolitical influence. The U.S.-Africa relationship has been plagued by the defining engagements of the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade and the Cold War. Both events were one-sided and provided little to no benefits to the African continent and its people. If anything, the meddling of the U.S. and other colonial powers left the continent in shambles and turned family against each other with arbitrary borders based on Allied and Axis “ownership.” Those battles are still being fought today and are fueled by external funding. Present-day conflicts continue to present proxy wars across the continent, with China being the only enduring entity that consistently resources multiple countries in Africa.36 Consequently, the U.S. must create an enduring strategy for Africa through DIMEC that builds trust, controls the information space, increases effective security posture with regional commands, promotes economic growth through U.S. commercialization, and cultural acceptance of past faults while seeking to understand impacts. If the United States fails to act decisively and differently, Africa will remain America’s blind spot and China’s greatest geopolitical windfall of the 21st century.

Andrea M. Peters, Ph.D., is a student at the U.S. National Defense University. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. National Defense University, the U.S. Department of Defense, or the U. S. Government.

Notes:

  1. Slavevoyages.org, “Slave Voyages,” Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade, 1990, accessed October 31, 2025. This database compiles information about more than 36,000 voyages that forcibly transported enslaved Africans across the Atlantic between 1514 and 1866. Search and analyze the database for information on the broad origins of enslaved people, the tortuous Middle Passage, and the destinations of Africans in the Americas.
  2. Slavevoyages.org, “Slave Voyages.”
  3. Deutsche Welle News, World War 1 Explained (2/4): The African Perspective (2018).
  4. Ieuan Griffiths, “Scramble for Africa: Inherited Political Boundaries,” The Geographical Journal 152, no. 2 (1986): 13.
  5. Michael Crowder, “The First World War and Its Consequences in Africa,” UNESCO Courier, 2018, accessed November 11, 2025.
  6. Hamid Lellou, “U.S. Relations in Africa and the New Cold War” (2024).
  7. Thomas Kwasi Tieku, A Brief History of U.S.-Africa Relations (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853: Institute for African Development, Cornell Press, 2012).
  8. Toyin Falola and Raphael Chijioke Njoku, United States & Africa Relations, 1400s to Present (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2020).
  9. Ousman Murzik Kobo, “A New World Order? Africa and China,” The Goldberg Center, 2013, accessed November 9, 2025.
  10. Lellou, “U.S. Relations in Africa and the New Cold War.”
  11. Tieku, A Brief History of U.S.-Africa Relations.
  12. “U.S. Southern European Task Force, Africa,” History, 2026, accessed February 7, 2026. (#12)
  13. Oluwatimilehin Sotubo and Cortez A. Cooper III, “Chinese Engagement With Africa,” RAND, 2025, accessed November 12, 2025, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2989-1.html.
  14. Congress.gov, Djibouti (Library of Congress, 2025).
  15. “U.S. Southern European Task Force, Africa,” History, 2026, accessed February 7, 2026. (#12)
  16. Realcountrysizes.com, “True Size of Africa: It’s Much Bigger Than You Think,” Real Country Sizes, 2025, accessed November 13, 2025.
  17. Congress.gov, Djibouti (Library of Congress, 2025).
  18. Congress.gov, Djibouti (Library of Congress, 2025).
  19. Lellou, “U.S. Relations in Africa and the New Cold War.”
  20. Tieku, A Brief History of U.S.-Africa Relations.
  21. Alex Vines and Jon Wallace, “China-Africa Relations,” Chatham House, 2023, accessed October 20, 2025.
  22. Oluwatimilehin Sotubu and Cortez A. Cooper III, Chinese Engagements With Africa (RAND, 2025).
  23. Vines and Wallace, “China-Africa Relations.”
  24. Sotubu and Cooper III, Chinese Engagements With Africa.
  25. U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2024 (2024).
  26. Kobo, “A New World Order? Africa and China.”
  27. Lellou, “U.S. Relations in Africa and the New Cold War.”
  28. U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2024 (2024).
  29. Kobo, “A New World Order? Africa and China.”
  30. Vines and Wallace, “China-Africa Relations.”
  31. Sotubu and Cooper III, Chinese Engagements With Africa.
  32. Vines and Wallace, “China-Africa Relations.”
  33. Sotubu and Cooper III, Chinese Engagements With Africa.
  34. U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2024 (2024).
  35. Kobo, “A New World Order? Africa and China.”
  36. Tieku, A Brief History of U.S.-Africa Relations.

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