Airpower, Landpower, Seapower – What Wins Wars
In “Armies Can’t Win Wars Alone,” (RealClearDefense June 1st 2026) airpower advocate David Deptula argues against the “categorical” proposition that “only armies can deliver strategic success.” The fact is that no one of prominence – not Army generals, not congressional supporters, not leading academics – makes that claim. Unlike the pantheon of airpower advocates, there are no famous “landpower” advocates, past or present, campaigning for the primacy of ground forces relative to the other services. Here, Deptula throws an empty punch.
In other writings, Deptula asserts that “air superiority is more essential to victory in warfare today than at any time since the concept first emerged over a century ago … air superiority has consistently served as the backbone of successful military strategy, ” enabling nations to “attain their most important goals while minimizing the need for combat operations.” The problem here is that, in war after war, despite overwhelming dominance in the air (a dominance purchased at extraordinary cost), American airpower has failed to deliver on that promise. Crushing air superiority in Korea and Vietnam in the end did not lead to victory. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the enemy had no air force or air defense at all, yet US air superiority yielded little in the way of campaign success. In the current campaign against Iran, nearly helpless in terms of air defense, US air superiority has nonetheless left us worse off than before the campaign even began, with the Strait of Hormuz closed, the regime and its army intact, and global energy prices soaring.
A possible exception is the 1991 Gulf War, often cited as proof of principle in this debate. Operation DESERT STORM presented an optimum test case for airpower. Here the theater was largely devoid of built up areas, with no forests or jungles to conceal the enemy. The Iraqi army was large but conventionally organized and relatively easy to target. Enemy air defense was not strong and the Iraqi air force posed no real threat. Under these ideal conditions airpower achieved striking success in degrading the Iraqi military prior to commencement of the ground war. Yet even here, powerful ground forces exceeding half a million troops were required to eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The oft-repeated claim that the war was won largely from the air is at best highly questionable and at worst badly overwrought.
Deptula also cites Kosovo as another example where “strategic success” was achieved without the need for landpower. There, NATO deployed massive airpower with a clear technology overmatch against a small, relatively backward state unsupported by any outside power. The British commander of NATO Forces in Kosovo, Lieutenant General Sir Michael Jackson, believed that the decision of the Russian government on 3 June 1999 to urge Milosevic to capitulate was decisive. U.S. General Wesley Clark, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, felt strongly that the imminent pressure of ground invasion “in particular” forced Milosevic to back down. In future, it is possible that very strong US airpower might overthrow a weak opponent unsupported by allies. That is hardly, however, a template for joint campaigns waged against competent, near-peer adversaries.
One hopes that the tedious back-and-forth about which service is paramount and under what circumstances may give way to a more balanced dialogue. In campaigns fought primarily at sea, maritime power will likely dominate. In those carried out on land, where physical occupation of territory and the destruction of enemy ground forces and physical infrastructure is required for campaign success, the Army may play a leading role. In virtually all cases, aerospace power will prove indispensable. The trick will be to merge and meld the many different capabilities inherent in the military services to maximum effect in the service of the political ends set forth by the national command authorities. Let’s stay focused on that.
R.D. Hooker Jr. is a Senior Fellow with The Atlantic Council. He is the author of “Beyond Vom Kriege: The Character and Conduct of Modern War.”