A U.S. Attack on Iran Is Still the Worst Option
Indirect nuclear negotiations between the U.S. and Iran resumed on February 6 for the first time since the 12-day war in June. However, amid deep distrust and disagreements over content, the Trump administration is increasingly seriously considering another attack on Tehran. Although Washington’s assertiveness makes it tempting, this option is just as dangerous today as it was when the latest Iran crisis began a month ago.
To a significant extent, the U.S. administration is drifting toward military escalation because of its overreach in rhetoric and policy.
For instance, in early January, President Trump encouraged Iranians to “keep protesting” against their regime and promised that “help [was] on the way.” Yet Tehran continued its massacre and crushed the opposition.
Since then, President Trump has recentered the narrative around nuclear issues. Yet his words have exposed him to unwanted parallels with former President Barack Obama’s inaction after Syria violated his red line on using chemical weapons against civilians in 2013.
Likewise, on January 28, President Trump declared that the “massive Armada” he had just dispatched toward Iran was “larger” than that recently deployed near Venezuela to overthrow Nicolás Maduro and could impose damage “far worse” than during the 12-day war if Iran maintained its nuclear program.
Yet those bombastic actions have reduced the space for diplomatic compromise, limited Trump’s capacity to de-escalate, and increased the likelihood of major strikes if tensions endure.
According to supporters, U.S. strikes could help Iranian civilians take control, especially if Washington supplied weapons to protesters or to militias in Iran’s Kurdistan and Baluchistan. More broadly, they believe eliminating Iran’s leaders would enable nuclear diplomacy, end decades of instability in the Middle East, and dismantle the Iran-Russia-China “axis.”
Yet, those arguments are misguided. First, Russia and China are not major threats to the U.S. in the Middle East. Moreover, their cooperation with Iran remains limited, opportunistic, and tainted by strategic mistrust.
Second, diplomacy is still the best path forward. Despite being officially theocratic, Iran’s regime is deeply pragmatic. Although Tehran might use talks to avoid an attack, constructive U.S. engagement could lead it to view negotiations as an opportunity to re-integrate into the international community, a prospect that could empower reformists. Although Iran has invested too much money and credibility in its nuclear program to renounce entirely, a deal might be within reach if the U.S. abandons unrealistic goals and considers options such as a drastic but non-total reduction of Tehran’s enrichment capabilities. Likewise, Iran might consider concessions on its ballistic missiles and regional proxies if Washington recognizes its fear of encirclement. By contrast, aggressiveness may bolster Tehran’s hardliners.
Third, an attack could dramatically exacerbate the problems Washington faces. U.S. strikes would create diplomatic controversy. For instance, although their response may remain limited, Russia and China would deeply resent them. Most Middle Eastern powers oppose an intervention due to fear of regional repercussions and Israel’s influence.
Above all, current U.S. military options invite strategic risks higher than before the 12-day war. Iran, which could plausibly see any strikes as a prelude to regime change, has shown unexpected resiliency before and could respond massively with its advanced asymmetric warfare assets. For instance, having restrained its ballistic missile strikes in June 2025 and largely refilled its arsenal since, it could endanger the tens of thousands of U.S. personnel located in the region.
It could also nudge its regional proxies into more ambitious attacks, and strike Israel by any means. Israel itself could escalate. Unlike in June 2025, President Trump might fail to stop the war from expanding.
U.S. strikes could bolster Iran’s regime due to resentment against foreign interference, fear of fragmentation, and the lack of moderate alternatives.
Air strikes are unlikely to eliminate Iran’s capabilities. Most importantly, the record of America’s interventions in the Middle East should dispel any regime change temptation.
Strikes could make the bomb a paramount priority for Tehran, which could succeed in two years. By once more targeting a state that stayed below the nuclear threshold, they may also incentivize proliferation in other countries.
The Iranian regime’s fall could help Revolutionary Guards take over, cause a civil war, enable terrorist “safe havens,” and destabilize neighboring countries, including Pakistan, a nuclear-armed state of 240 million people.
Washington also risks overstretching itself. For example, having consumed 25% of its THAAD interceptors during the 12-day war, it could weaken its missile defense in other theaters. More broadly, escalation would contradict its recent National Defense Strategy, which aims to “prioritiz[e] the gravest and most consequential threats,” located mostly in the Western Hemisphere and the Indo-Pacific.
The U.S. should resist the pressures for strikes on Iran. Although sanctions and cyberattacks may maintain pressure without escalation, Washington should prioritize engagement and focus its immediate attention on reasonable nuclear negotiations.
Thomas P. Cavanna Non-Resident Fellow, Defense Priorities and Collaborating Academic Visitor, Lehigh University.