A New Flashpoint for the Axis of Resistance?
Will the South Caucasus be a New Flashpoint for the Axis of Resistance?
Amid the escalating tensions in the Middle East, Iran reportedly threatened to attack several countries, including Azerbaijan, UAE, and Saudi Arabia. This latest development illustrates several points that people calling on the US government to pressure Israel into a ceasefire with Hamas and Hizbullah are ignoring. First, Iran is ready and willing to expand and escalate the conflict, including by attacking neighboring countries with which Tehran shares diplomatic relations. Tehran has no qualm about turning any state in the region into a political hostage to its ambitions; the price for peace is silence, neutrality, or even reorientation in support of the “Axis of Resistance”. Second, Iran is using its conflict with Israel as an excuse to strengthen its positions not only in the Middle East but elsewhere, including the South Caucasus. Tehran has become more aggressive, as seen with the attacks on Azerbaijan’s Embassies in Tehran and London. Tehran is also purportedly behind terrorist and spy infiltrations, which Baku publicly exposed. The embarrassment from being accused of hostile activity did not stop Tehran from continuing its path of aggression. While the latest salvo in this drama, the threat to attack Azerbaijan with missiles, was met with a tough retort from the country’s President Ilham Aliyev, Iran’s incursions into the South Caucasus show no signs of stopping.
Along with Russia, Iran has been at the head of exploiting and exacerbating Yerevan’s tensions with Baku. In recent years, as Armenia and Azerbaijan moved towards normalization, Tehran and the Kremlin sought ways to take advantage of Armenia’s economic and political dependency to undermine the peace process. Armenia has long been at the crossroads of integrating into the South Caucasus, partaking in energy projects alongside Azerbaijan and Georgia, and turning towards the West – or continuing its legacy relationships with Russia and Iran, which at the peak of tensions with Baku appeared as a welcome alternative to Yerevan’s decisionmakers. Russia’s backing of Armenia has been domineering, costly, and not always dependable. Armenia has for over a century hosted Russian military bases. Despite growing trade with Moscow to record highs this year, Armenia remains a poor country; not only because it is land-locked and short on natural resources, but by virtue of this dependency it has been virtually isolated from cultivating partnerships and investment opportunities outside these toxic alliances.
Russia has kept Armenia on a short leash. Current PM Pashinyan’s efforts to leave dangerous co-dependency behind have been met with a reported coup attempt and assorted domestic disturbances, all allegedly organized by Russian secret services alongside domestic opposition via the Armenian Apostolic Church. On the flipside, despite Yerevan’s pro-Western ambitions, most Armenian companies are still very much in business with Moscow; private relations are harder to alter than official state policies.
Iran also views these developments with suspicion. Armenia has become an important transit point for Iranian weapons; should Yerevan turn towards the West, this conduit could be compromised by closer scrutiny from Washington and Brussels. Iran is also increasing its economic relations with Armenia by opening up a trade center in Yerevan. Such trade centers in Oman and elsewhere frequently front for illicit economic activity, such as sanctions circumvention and money laundering. In this case, the trade center would facilitate Iran’s plan for an EEZ and open a door into the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). That, in turn, advances Iran’s trade ambitions with five countries, opening new markets and providing a potential lifeline against any additional Western instruments of financial pressure. All in all, Iran is planning to expand its economic collaboration with Armenia to the tune of $3 billion, which would boost each country’s economy, and provide funding outside the Western-based framework that Armenia is touting. This volume of economic activity with the Islamic Republic should worry the West in light of Iran’s expansion of conflicts, and the growth of terrorist activities, including the rise in attempted assassinations against Israeli business people, American officials, and dissidents. Moreover, the regime would not wish to inconvenience its clandestine flight options: Flight Travel, an Armenian airline, reportedly fronted for the sanctioned IRGC-linked Mahan Air, and was also sanctioned by US Treasury for its role in transporting Iran-affiliated Shia Afghan and Pakistani fighters to Syria.
Iran purportedly is already an arms supplier to Armenia, which is diversifying its provider base and modernizing its military. Shahed drones currently co-developed with Russia for use against Ukraine could be used against Azerbaijan in a future conflict, especially if the Pashinyan government falls. Another risk of the growing relations between Iran and Armenia is the possibility of Iranian troops being hosted on Armenian soil. Joint exercises have already occurred. Iranian bases to complement or supplant Russian bases would give Tehran a more direct shot at Europe and open another front to attack Azerbaijan.
Armenia may well intend to leave its alliance with Russia, but Russia is unlikely to release its primary sphere of influence without a fight. Moreover, while Armenia is showing every political sign of distancing itself from Moscow, and despite its increased openness to the West, Yerevan and Tehran are still tight as thieves. Russia and Iran are likely to benefit from each other’s investments in Armenia, particularly when it comes to security and military interests. Russia has been openly backing the “Axis of Resistance” in the Middle East as chaos provides a justification for intervention via its “peacekeepers“. The Russia-Iran-Armenia relationship is a direct threat to US interests in both the South Caucasus and the Middle East. As Russia’s political influence in Yerevan wanes, it looks to use the private sector to retain indirect influence that could be used to undercut Pashinyan’s policies. Russia is more likely than ever to try to push its way into a closer relationship with Azerbaijan.
Iran seeks to exploit Baku’s grievances with the United States to isolate Baku from the West and to break the Azerbaijan-Israel relationship. While that outcome is not likely, Iran’s attempt to expand the current conflict into the South Caucasus is still damaging and must be opposed.
Irina Tsukerman is a national security lawyer, geopolitical analyst, Fellow at the Jerusalem Center for Foreign Affairs, and President of Scarab Rising, Inc.