A Defense Budget Increase Is Due, but Reforms Must Occur for Durable Deterrence
Securing a meaningful defense topline for FY‑2027 is not an act of militarism; it is an act of prudence. The strategic environment is more dangerous and more interconnected than most Americans appreciate. Credible deterrence requires ready forces, modern capabilities and an industrial base that can surge. President Trump’s anticipated budget request of $1.5 trillion alone will not deliver security. To turn dollars into durable deterrence, the White House and Congress must continue to move in parallel to reform Foreign Military Sales (FMS), harden supply chains for critical technologies, and accelerate onshoring of advanced manufacturing—while using the budget to catalyze allied burden‑sharing and interoperability.
Deterrence is arithmetic. It demands platforms, munitions, sensors, and the logistics to sustain them. It also demands speed: partners must be able to field interoperable systems quickly when crises arise. Our principal Cold War legacy tool for equipping allies and partners, the FMS process, has often functioned like a paper mill rather than a strategic instrument. Lengthy case processing, opaque timelines, and fragmented authorities risk push U.S. partners toward alternative suppliers and slow coalition readiness. The Trump administration could issue time‑bound directives to shorten FMS case processing and expand delegated authorities to expedite routine transfers. Congress could codify predictable timelines for licensing decisions and provide resources to modernize case management. Faster, more predictable FMS will let allies and partners confidently buy U.S. systems with the “total package approach” my former colleagues and I advocated, as well as make coalition logistics simpler and cheaper.
Supply chains are the other half of the equation. Advanced microelectronics, semiconductors, specialty chemicals, battery materials, and precision components are the backbone of modern military power. Over the past two decades, critical nodes have migrated offshore. That migration is a strategic vulnerability. Recent federal incentives have begun to reverse that trend: targeted public support has catalyzed private investment in domestic semiconductor capacity and related supply chains. But incentives alone are not enough. Procurement commitments, tax clarity, and surge‑financing mechanisms are necessary to make large capital projects bankable and to ensure that domestic lines can expand rapidly in a crisis.
Onshoring is not protectionism for its own sake; it is insurance. A resilient domestic industrial base shortens logistics, reduces single‑point dependencies, and creates surge capacity. It also delivers economic dividends—high‑wage manufacturing jobs, regional investment, and a broader tax base to sustain long‑term defense spending. Policymakers should target incentives to defense‑relevant sectors: semiconductors, power systems, advanced composites, and critical‑minerals processing. They should pair those incentives with procurement signals—multi‑year buys and co‑investment clauses—that give industry the market certainty needed to plan and scale.
A larger U.S. budget should also be a lever for allied burden‑sharing and interoperability. Rather than substituting for partner investment, U.S. spending should encourage allies and partners to specialize and co‑invest in complementary capabilities—sustainment, munitions production, logistics hubs, and technologies like semiconductors. Joint procurement vehicles and shared industrial roadmaps reduce per‑unit costs and shorten fielding timelines. When allies and partners buy compatible systems and co‑invest in production lines, the alliance network is not only interoperable, but itself also becomes a strategic asset to meet shared challenges.
Practical tradeoffs are real. Rapid onshoring requires patient capital and predictable policy. FMS reform requires political will to cede some bureaucratic control in favor of speed and predictability. Congress should pair any topline increase with statutory incentives for domestic production of defense‑relevant components and authorize surge financing for rapid industrial expansion in emergencies. The executive branch should publish clearer interoperability standards and require co‑procurement clauses in major platform sales so allied purchases reinforce coalition logistics and supply chains rather than fragment them.
Absent these complementary reforms, a larger FY‑2027 budget risks buying platforms the U.S. cannot properly sustain, partners we cannot quickly equip, and supply chains we cannot readily rely on in crisis. Approving resources is the opening move; turning those resources into sustained strategic advantage requires institutional and industrial follow‑through.
If policymakers want deterrence that endures, they must treat the budget as the beginning of a program of national resilience. Approve the resources. Modernize the tools that deliver them. Rebuild the industrial base that sustains them. That combination will make our deterrent capability credible, our alliances more resilient and our economy stronger.
R. Clarke Cooper is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and is the founder and president of Guard Hill House, LLC. He previously served as assistant secretary for political-military affairs at the US Department of State.